The Planning and Execution of Security for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games

38 Best Practices and Lessons Learned

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Research Team: Jennifer Armstrong (BA), Tara Haarhoff (BA), Jason Levine (BA), Rebecca Richardson (BA), Kristen Chaisson, Jeff Houlihan
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Acknowledgments

We would not have been able to produce this report, or complete the project upon which it is based without the cooperation of many individuals. Ultimately, this project was grounded in the thoughtful and instructive insights of the interviewees as they reflected on their participation in the planning and execution of the 2010 Winter Games security. We were consistently struck by their dedication to their role in supporting the Games, and that was especially the case with regard to those involved in planning. It was clear that these were individuals, who not only brought their incredible talent to the table but did so with an enormous sense of pride and responsibility. We were especially grateful for their candidness as they described the challenges they faced and what could be done to better facilitate the activities of those involved in the planning and execution of future events.

Instrumental to our work was the support we received throughout the project from the members of the Integrated Security Unit C2 Team, including Project Manager Dix Lawson, Retired RCMP Inspector Ken Gates, and Vancouver City Police Sergeant Jim Scott. From beginning to end they consistently went out of their way to facilitate our efforts to conduct a comprehensive review. Finally, we are grateful for the support provided to us by the senior leadership of the Integrated Security Unit, and in particular, RCMP Chief Superintendent Mike Sekela and RCMP Assistant Commissioner Bud Mercer.
As the officer responsible for leading and coordinating the policing operation for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, it is a great privilege to be asked to write the foreword for this report.

There is no doubt that the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games were a huge success and the part played by the Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit (ISU), led by RCMP Assistant Commissioner Bud Mercer, cannot be underestimated. Police and staff from the Metropolitan Police and other UK Police Forces were given unprecedented access to both the planning for the 2010 Games and to the security operation during the Games itself. This ensured that those planning the London 2012 Games were provided a real insight into the work of our Canadian counterparts.

It is clear from that the meticulous planning undertaken by the ISU paid off and resulted in a highly successful operation which allowed the focus to be on the sport, while providing a security presence that was visible and effective but not oppressive.

Those involved in the policing of major public order and security operations are aware that lessons can be learnt from every event, however successful it has been. In an effort to learn those lessons, the ISU leadership conducted their own formal internal debrief process but they also had the presence of mind to commission an independent evaluation of their work. The result of this evaluation is this report which provides a clear and thoughtful analysis of the best practices that were so clearly demonstrated and in some cases established by the 2010 Integrated Security Unit as well as the lessons learned that should inform major event planning around the globe. The fact that this research was conducted and has now been published reinforces the professionalism of the ISU and their commitment to contributing to the dialogue with respect to security planning for major events.

RCMP Assistant Commissioner Bud Mercer and the Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit have set the bar very high and our goal for the London 2012 Games is to emulate the success of our Canadian counterparts.

Chris Allison
Assistant Commissioner
Metropolitan Police Service
London 2012 National Olympic Security Coordinator
As has been said so many times by so many observers, the 2010 Winter Olympic Games proved to be a huge success story. Maclean’s magazine, in its commemorative issue on the event, called them “the greatest games ever” and “an unmitigated success”. In that same issue, Macleans reminded readers that the Games were the most watched ever with some 32 million Canadians and 3.5 billion people worldwide tuning in. John Furlong, the CEO of the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC), noted at the closing ceremonies of the Games that “if the Canada that came together on opening night was a little mysterious to some, now it no longer is.” Speaking at the closing ceremonies, Jacques Rogge, President of the International Olympic Committee, remarked “I’ve seen a fantastic atmosphere of respect. The behavior of the crowd in the venues was absolutely outstanding, something you do not see very much, so this is all to the credit of the Canadians.” For Canadians especially, there were many reasons to be proud. Over and over again, Canadian athletes showed the world that they are great competitors. Day in and day out over the course of the seventeen day Games schedule, Canadians showed our visitors that we are warm and welcoming hosts, we know how to have a good time, and we have an enormous sense of national pride.

While the overall success of the Games was noted around the world, it was also quickly apparent that the security provided for the games was a notable success. In describing the security operations to the media in the week following the Games, Vancouver City Deputy Police Chief, Doug LePard, noted that “I am pretty sure we won gold”. It would also appear that those responsible for Games security won gold in the minds of Games visitors as they described their feelings with respect to personal safety, the security presence and the inconvenience caused by security. As part of this project, we talked to 487 Games visitors as they returned in the evenings from attending various Games events. Specifically, only one of 487 visitors reported not feeling safe during the Games, and only three reported that their sense of personal safety was negatively influenced by the presence of security. Importantly, 98% of visitors surveyed reported that the inconvenience caused by security was reasonable. In short, the cross-section of visitors we talked to spoke very positively about the security provided and the degree to which it made them feel safe.

Clearly, the fact that the public felt good about the security provided at the Games does not mean that the security operations were planned or executed as well as they could have been. Understandably, visitors would be thinking primarily in terms of entrance security issues, police and private security behavior, crowd control and general police visibility. Also impacting general public perceptions would be that, from a security point of view, virtually nothing of significance happened during the Games. While there were a number of protests at the beginning of the Games, security personnel appeared to respond in a timely and effective manner reducing the opportunity for the escalation of these events. Media coverage following each of these events clearly indicated that the public was generally comfortable with police responses to various incidents. Still the public was not privy to all that was going on behind the scenes. Nor were they

Importantly, the Games also provided an opportunity to show the world that the City of Vancouver truly deserves its reputation as one of the most beautiful cities in the world and that the Province of British Columbia has good reason to boast that residents live in the most beautiful place on earth. Clearly, those responsible for bidding on the Games in the first instance, and the thousands of people who planned and delivered them so well should be applauded.
privy to the lead up to the Games, and the planned readiness to respond to major protests, terrorist threats, or any other security concerns. The public also would not know if the money they committed as taxpayers to security was well spent. With that in mind, this report, which provides an inside look at the planning and execution of Games security, will be of interest to a variety of stakeholders including the general public. It should provide an assurance that the public had good reason to feel safe, that security measures were well planned and executed, and that governments and police were seriously attentive to the costs associated with the provision of security for the Games.

The impetus for this report, and the evaluation upon which it is based, originated with the 2010 Integrated Security Unit (ISU) and its interest in an independent evaluation of its work as the RCMP section responsible for the planning and execution of Games security. The ISU will have its own action report that addresses security planning and execution in a very detailed manner. The purpose of this report is to provide comment helpful to the organization and planning of future major events and is focused on what might be described as more general lessons to be learned.

There are very clear challenges associated with conducting any type of evaluation of the security operations of an event such as the Winter Games, not the least of which is the sheer magnitude of the event and the consequent complexities of the planning and execution of the associated operations; however, the methodology employed in this evaluation enabled a very thorough and detailed assessment of the security planning and operations for the Winter Games.

This project is very clear in its mandate to document the perceptions of those most intimately involved with this undertaking as they relate to “what went right?” and “what could have gone better?”, with the goal of capturing the lessons learned in a meaningful and useful manner to support the security operations associated with future major events. It was with our focus clearly on the legacy value associated with hosting the Games that we undertook this project, constructed our methodological design and developed this report.

While there are always lessons to be learned from any security operation, in the case of an event the size of the Olympics, those lessons are magnified because of the heightened interest of the public, the enormous fiscal commitments, and the international nature of the event. In some cases the lessons learned in this report simply reflect processes and structural responses that worked well and should be integrated into the planning of future major events. In other cases, the lessons learned capture suggestions for how the planning and execution of security operations could have been improved. Overall, the RCMP led Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit was successful in fulfilling its mandate to secure the Winter Games and to do it in a manner that was responsive to threat assessments, fiscal realities, and providing the least restrictive venue access possible for the public.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

In developing our methodology we were primarily and consistently attentive to the goal of providing a picture of the lessons learned from the planning and execution of security operations for the Winter Games. While our frame of reference was clear, our goal was to incorporate multiple data collection strategies, both quantitative and qualitative, to examine the perceived successes and challenges associated with the security operations of the ISU. It is important to stress that we were focused on the operations of the ISU and while attentive to their partners, we acknowledge that putting any one of those partners at the centre of an evaluation would shift the lens and emphasis placed on various components of security operations for the Games.

The methodology employed to carry out this evaluation consisted of five key components: in-person interviews of key stakeholders; a survey of security personnel; a content analysis of media coverage; statistical analysis of crime and security data; and, a clipboard survey of visitors to the Games.

The in-person interviews were conducted with 100 lead planners, commanders, and other individuals having a key role in the planning and/or the execution of Games security. These interviews were guided by a series of questions focusing on how interviewees felt about their readiness to take on their respective roles, what they saw as their most significant challenges, what went especially right, what went wrong, what they would do differently if starting over, what they saw as legacies (if any) for the planning and execution of future major events. Most of the interviews were conducted one on one with a single member of the research team; however, a small number of interviews were conducted with multiple interviewees, and/or multiple researchers. A purposive sampling technique was used in an effort to identify a pool of participants that reflected the complexities of the functions of the security operations for the Games.

All of the selected participants contacted agreed to be interviewed.

The survey of security personnel was conducted of the 4000 police officers deployed to the Games, 3500 of whom were housed on accommodation vessels docked in Vancouver and 500 of whom were housed in rented private accommodation and hotels in Whistler. Each of these officers received a questionnaire asking them to assess of their work assignment, their food and lodging, the impact of their deployment on family and home detachment work demands, and their experiences in general. Overall, 38% (1514) of the officers responded and an analysis of the response rate suggests that those responding are generally representative of police deployed from across Canada and across police agencies. Additionally, it would appear that respondents were representative in terms of gender (20% were female), RCMP / Municipal members (25% were Municipal officers) and area deployment (12% were based in Whistler).

The content analysis of media coverage was conducted focusing on the themes and content of security related media coverage of the 2010 Winter Games. Selected media was monitored on a daily basis for any security related Olympic coverage during the two weeks leading up to the Games, during the Games, and the two weeks following the Games\(^1\). It also involved a search of archived security related media coverage dating back to when Vancouver was awarded the Games in 2003.

These news services often provided information or links to other sites offering Olympic security commentary. Blogs, independent web pages, social networking sites and other “new” media were used for this analysis only when they were linked to, incorporated or identified by a mainstream media outlet.

\(^1\) This involved The Vancouver Sun, The Province, Victoria Times-Colonist, National Post, Globe and Mail, CTV, CBC, and Global Television. Canada’s two most prominent news aggregator services, National Newswatch and Bourque, were also monitored daily. Yahoo Sports (one of the most thorough resources for this undertaking) was another news aggregator regularly monitored. This was an especially thorough resource that collected Olympic media coverage on a global basis.
The analysis of crime and security incidents was conducted with respect to venues, host communities, the Lower Mainland of British Columbia, and province-wide during the Games. This analysis involved comparing crime rates over the Games time period to the same time period in the four previous years.

The clipboard survey, as already referred to in the introduction, was conducted of 500 visitors to the Games, all of whom were approached at park and ride drop off locations as they returned from specific events. Ten of those approached did not speak English and three indicated that they did not have time to be interviewed resulting in 487 surveys being completed.

As has already been stated, the primary focus of this evaluation is on the perceptions of those working within the Integrated Security Unit. It is important to remember that while most of the key external partners are only mentioned in a cursory fashion, that is not because they did not play a key role in the planning and execution of security at the Games. Quite the opposite is true, and there are no better examples of this than the Vancouver Police Department and the Canadian Forces. The cooperation and support of both of these organizations, and so many others, was instrumental in securing the Games. The balance of this report will highlight 38 best practices and lessons learned that are supported by the data collected and analyzed for this evaluation.
As Canada’s national police force, the RCMP was tasked with the lead responsibility for the planning and the execution of the security for the 2010 Winter Games coordinating with Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Department of National Defence (DND), Industry Canada (IC), Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), Public Safety Canada (PS), Transport Canada (TC), Health Canada (HC), Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), Canada Post and Privy Council Office (PCO). In October 2007, the Prime Minister appointed a Federal Coordinator for Vancouver 2010 and the G8 Summit to work out of the Privy Council Office as the point person between the Federal Government and the RCMP.

**Planning Stage**

In response to its lead role, the RCMP through its Major Events and Protective Services (ME&PS) unit and E Division established the Integrated Security Unit (ISU) which served as the umbrella organization responsible for securing the Games. The ISU, which was established in 2003, was eventually structured with an Assistant Commissioner at its helm and was focused on the monumental task of planning for the Games. Accordingly, the organization was initially staffed by a collection of planners. This first wave of planners was responsible for developing the plans needed to execute security leading up to and during the Games including the establishment of the requirements associated with intelligence, mobilization, accreditation, transportation, accommodation, logistics, and informatics. Overall, by the time the Games started, the planning contingent of staff had grown to more than 500 police officers, civilian members, and contracted employees.

Reporting to the RCMP Assistant Commissioner in charge (otherwise referred to as the Chief Operating Officer) was a 2 I/C (although that 2 I/C was not in place until May 2009). Reporting to the 2 I/C were four superintendents, each of whom had responsibility for a wide range of security related issues. Reporting to each of those superintendents were team leaders representing a range of security related areas associated with finance, human resources, informatics and intelligence. This internal organizational structure worked well, although it was clear that the superintendents had unusually heavy workloads, complicated by the need for each to be versed in the operational plans of all four security portfolios. Further, the Assistant Commissioner’s responsibilities were extensive as he was leading internal operations of the ISU while responding to an unprecedented number of external demands (which was further complicated by the fact that he was often required off site). This workload and its associated impact on the speed of communication and decision-making were aided by the formal appointment of a 2 I/C.

While the internal command structure and its associated authority lines were clearly delineated and generally understood, the same was not entirely true for reporting lines and mandates external to the ISU. There was a persistent theme in many of our interviews that described concerns about ME&PS overstepping in its involvement with the operations of the ISU. These concerns were often described as having “multiple masters” and a perception of “meddling” from Ottawa. Ironically, the mandate of the ME&PS clearly articulates its primary and significant role in the planning, budgeting and oversight of any major events. What complicates what is so clearly the actual policy, is the accepted practice that operations are almost always the domain of the particular division and in many cases the particular detachment involved and that Ottawa’s role is to serve as a policy centre.

As outlined in the conclusion of this report, it is our view that this disconnect between policy and practice needs to be addressed to provide clarity with respect
to roles and responsibilities and to highlight the need for an enhanced project management office capable of fulfilling the range of support functions that would characterize the ME&PS Unit under this revised mandate. Having said that, in the absence of this change, and in the face of some of the confusion and uncertainty with respect to the relationship between the ISU and national headquarters (NHQ), it was clear that the management skills of senior managers and the strength of their existing relationships were instrumental in supporting the successful execution of the security plans for the Winter Games.

In addition to the federal partners described above, the ISU coordinated with a number of key partners including provincial bodies such as the Province of British Columbia, BC Transit, Emergency BC, various city councils, and most significantly, the police of jurisdiction (Vancouver, North Vancouver, Whistler and Richmond) in the host communities for various Olympic venues. All of these organizations had very specific responsibilities relating to the planning and execution of security for Vancouver 2010 and not coincidentally, most of these partners had individuals working in the ISU.

**Operations Stage – Command & Control Model**

Central to the organizational structure of the ISU was the command model for the execution of security. The command model integrated the primacy of localized (ground level) decision-making, a tiered authority and resource structure to respond to any escalation of circumstances, and clear lanes of responsibility. Given the other policing and security partners, the command structure emphasized respectful and collaborative relations with the police of jurisdiction.

More specifically, the command model consisted of what were called Gold, Silver, and Bronze command levels. The Venue level command, led by Bronze Commanders, was responsible for security operations at the venues within the Theatre of Operations. The Area Command level, headed up by Silver Commanders, was responsible for ensuring that the appropriate resources were made available to the Bronze Command if and when those resources were required. Silver Commanders were also responsible for the deployment of under command units such as Emergency Response Teams, Tactical Units, Bomb Squads, and Dive Teams. Gold Commanders held the responsibility for moving various security assets within and between the two Games Areas (Whistler and Vancouver) as required. The Gold Command through its Gold Commanders was responsible for having a readiness to respond to a catastrophic event and/or the need to employ air defence resources. Finally, Gold Command had a responsibility for responding to government queries received through the chain of command from the RCMP National Operations Centre, generally originating in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), regarding security issues during the Games.

During the Games, the Silver and Gold Commanders worked inside their respective Command Centres, while Bronze Commanders worked on site at their respective venues. As highlighted above, this command structure was predicated on the expectation that commanders “stay in their own lane”. Specifically, the model demanded that a Silver Commander would not become involved in the business of venue security unless specifically requested to do so by a Bronze Venue Commander or the police of jurisdiction or if it was determined to be necessary by the appropriate level of command. Likewise, it was expected that a Gold Commander would not become involved with the affairs of Silver Command or the police of jurisdiction unless specifically requested to do so or if it was determined to be necessary by the appropriate level of command.

Overall, the command model received very favourable reviews and seemed to work effectively in terms of organizational expectations, lines of authority, and responsiveness to security-related concerns; however, there were a number of cultural issues that arose in relation to the model. As might be expected in an organization with personnel conditioned to be active and engaged, there were individuals who expressed...
difficulty in restraining their involvement in events and issues that did not fall within their responsibility. Individuals at both Gold and Silver command levels reported feeling and sometimes succumbing to the temptation, that is so characteristic of the task-oriented culture of policing, to lean into a different lane. It did not appear that this contravention of protocol occurred with any amount of frequency and when prompted on the issue, Commanders at both the Silver and Gold levels explained that it was their “natural inclination” as experienced police commanders to want to be involved. In some cases, these commanders expressed frustration that their interest and need for information was misunderstood as an overstepping of the boundaries of responsibility. However, even in these cases, with further exploration, individuals often admitted that they sometimes confused their desire for information with a need to know information. Despite this perception regarding the need for more information, the Commanders were in Command Centres where they had access to all of the significant partners and to the police of jurisdiction. Part of this access to information was made possible because the Command Centres facilitated electronic monitoring of activities theatre wide. The challenges with respect to “staying in your lane” were exacerbated by the relative quiet, from a security point of view, that characterized the Games. Without exception, the Silver and Gold Commanders expressed a need to do more and a concomitant concern that they weren’t doing enough. This organizational need to remain within mandate was symbolically and practically manifested in the physical layout of the Command Centre in Vancouver with separate rooms for Gold and Silver Command and even a glass partition between the Gold Commander’s station and the rest of the Command Centre.

Having said all that, the Commanders clearly had an understanding of and respect for the command model. Many interviewees emphasized the importance of letting people do their respective jobs, trusting in the expertise others brought to their task at different levels and foremost, trusting the initial work done by the planners.

It is this intangible quality of strong management that cannot be captured in an organizational chart that was so critical to the successful implementation of the command structure. The officers placed in command positions were long serving officers with extensive backgrounds in management and critical/crisis incident management. They were clearly comfortable with the responsibility of their portfolios, the potential for having to deal with changing circumstances, and the need to respect the authority of the police of jurisdiction. An illustration of their ability to understand the reality of Games security was their concern about the potential for complacency to set in as they moved further into the Games. Accordingly, the Commanders saw a significant part of their responsibility as keeping those in the Command Centre at a heightened level of awareness.

A final theme that arose in many of our interviews with commanders was that there were possible redundancies in the operationalization of the model. This sense of redundancy arose as a direct result of the high level of activity in the Command Centre during the three major exercises juxtaposed to the actual low incidence of security issues during the Games period. The prediction that 90% of the work would be done at the venues turned out to be true resulting in a sense of redundancy at Gold Theatre Command and to a lesser extent Silver Area Command. However, Command Centres must be capable of performing their duties and providing a response to the assessed threat level. The fact that the actual Games operation did not experience anything above a low threat, and thus required minimal support from the Silver and Gold Command Centres, does not make Command Centre positions and capabilities redundant. In fact, this relative quiet in the Command Centres should not be expected for other major events such as G8 and G20.

Overall, it would appear that the command structure provided a model that has tremendous legacy value.
as it embodied a successful organizational structure which is operationally responsive to the key parameters associated with the planning and execution of security for major events.

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**Lessons Learned**

A responsibility assignment matrix must be in place at the outset.

Leaders at the top of the responsibility matrix will benefit from having trusted relationships with one another.

A Z I/C must be appointed at the outset and given the authority to oversee daily work.

The principles of the V2010 ISU Olympic C2 Model are transferable and scalable to any major event.
FINANCES

When the City of Vancouver submitted its bid to host the 2010 Winter Olympic Games, the cost of providing security for the event was estimated at approximately $175,000,000 – one-third of the final actual budget of $558,000,000. Given this difference it should not be surprising that many people in and outside the media were speculating on the reasons for such a significant discrepancy and expressing concern about who was guarding the taxpayers’ interest. At the very least, it is easy to understand the questions raised with respect to the process undertaken to reach that initial estimate. Certainly, in starting our project these questions were serious considerations. As we worked through our interviews, it became increasingly clear that planners and organizers of Games security could not be accused of financial mismanagement. Indeed, as will be pointed out in this section, serious attention was paid to the matter of finances throughout the planning and execution of security for the Games, and mechanisms and initiatives were in place to ensure that costs were monitored and kept in check as much as possible. Moreover, as it turned out, the final tally for the Games is expected to be very close to the budget that had been established three years prior to the Games.

“To be most responsible, effective, and influential in terms of safeguarding public funds you should have had the opportunity to be involved in every decision”

RCMP Superintendent Alain DuPlantie Director of Finance, ISU

Having said that, certainly a number of issues could have been approached differently, some of which undoubtedly would have accrued some savings, others of which would have brought clarity for outside observers of security spending, and still others which would have made the process of dealing with the financing of the Games less stressful for all involved. With this in mind, it is helpful to more closely examine the initial estimate of $175,000,000.

First, it is important to understand the context within which the bid estimates are developed and ultimately presented. For instance, we heard that prospective hosts may be motivated to keep the publicly announced cost of security as low as possible so as to increase the chances of having their bid supported by the public and in turn more likely to be a winning one. In short, some individuals speculate that those involved in the bid for the 2010 Games likely suspected that the $175,000,000 was an underestimate but were conscious of the sensitivities associated with raising that figure in terms of potentially hurting Vancouver’s chances of being selected as host. Whether or not this “motivation to win the bid” played any significant role in the estimation of security costs for the 2010 Games, we do not know. But there are two other considerations that deserve attention, both of which suggest that the $175,000,000 was not a deliberate underestimate to hide true expected costs.

The first consideration is that the initial costing is simply a reflection of estimators and organizers sincerely trying to make it all work on a shoe string budget, and by relying heavily on resources already in place. At least some of the people we interviewed believe that is why the 2010 Games were first estimated at only $175,000,000. Interviewees pointed out that even as it was becoming obvious that the initial estimate was too low, some senior police officials were still adamant that organizers and planners should move forward on the premise that the $175,000,000 figure be considered the final budget. Organizers and planners were told to “make it work”. Accordingly, at least in the early times after the bid, some people believed that the cost estimates were workable.

The second consideration (and our view) is that the $175,000,000 should never have been called or
otherwise regarded as a final estimate in the first instance. Specifically, and as would commonly be the case in the pre-planning process or the initiation phase of a project of this magnitude, planners would normally have referred to the $175,000,000 as “indicative funding”. That is, funding which is knowingly based on cost estimates which are bald of detail and options analysis, but which is expected to grow upward as the planning process facilitates the ability to review options and provide detailed information.

Irrespective of the exact reasons for the underestimate, it would seem to be fair comment that more should have been done at the time to provide clarity respecting how the $175,000,000 figure was arrived at. For instance, many people are probably not aware that this figure did not include the later decision to compensate municipalities and provinces in Canada for the cost of police officers loaned to the Games. Nor did it include the later decision to pay private security costs that were, at least in part, initially presumed to be the responsibility of the Vancouver Organizing Committee. Nor was it based on a full understanding of the details surrounding the cost of providing accommodation for officers working at the Games. In any case, ensuring broader and public transparency in the budgeting process would have helped to lessen any misinterpretations and misgivings that might have been held with respect to the original estimate.

Importantly, once preparations for Games security moved through the initiation phase and into the preliminary planning period beginning approximately four years prior to the Games, the matter of finances became paramount. This period represents the real beginning of the planning process and the point at which organizers focused on developing an accurate projection of anticipated costs and it was at this point that the half billion dollar cost estimate was put on the table. Most importantly, it was also at this juncture that a Director of Finance was established for the Integrated Security Unit. The Director of Finance was immediately mindful of the necessity for a new budget and together with a small team developed the half billion dollar estimate that turned out to be very close to the final total.

The hiring of a Director of Finance was critical to ultimately establishing an accurate working budget. Once the Director was put in place, the stage was set to ensure that decisions would be made with serious attention to costs, cost saving possibilities, and the need to stay on budget. This is not to say that those involved were not respectful of costs prior to the arrival of the Director of Finance, but it is clear that his arrival brought a much more layered and informed approach to financial planning. Specifically, prior to his arrival planners tended to build and consider plans with a focus on public safety issues with the cost considerations being addressed after the fact. While it is understandable that security planners would think this way, the Director of Finance emphasized a culture of planning in which financial considerations were woven throughout the planning process as opposed to simply included at the end. The direction to stay on budget was clear and this more integrated model of planning allowed the Director of Finance to highlight the importance for planners to be attentive to all true costs including the impact on the cost of operations not directly related to their own area of responsibility.

The challenges to be expected in terms of efforts to stay on budget cannot be understated. The reality was in the case of the 2010 Games that plans were ever changing leading up to the event, conditions changed, expectations sometimes changed, and some costs were simply unforeseeable. In fact, it is this reality of having to be ready for financial change to accommodate the inevitability of changing conditions which highlights the need for a significant contingency fund for securing major events. One important issue which made staying on budget particularly difficult was the fact that individual operational plans, which had dependencies external and outside the control of the ISU, were not always formulated in a timely fashion due to the inability of external partners to always complete their work on time and within scope. Another important issue was the fact that while the budget had been
established, funding approval did not actually happen until two years later. Both of these issues produced delays which complicated the securing of best pricing on major contracts with respect to private security and accommodations.

While the appointment of a Director of Finance was critical to keeping planners attentive to finance issues it is also important to remember that systems were in place to ensure carefulness in spending. For example, financial audits were conducted at regular intervals during the planning phase and the Director of Finance implemented a file review system in place to facilitate those audits. Notably, the file review system proved to be so effective that it was applied to the planning and execution of other major events in Canada.

Further, RCMP Major Events and Protective Services were keeping their own watchful eyes on spending. In fact, the oversight exercised by ME&PS was a source of some tension and frustration within the Integrated Security Unit. Specifically, just months prior to the start of the Games the officials from Major Events and Protective Services conducted one of its reviews of ISU security plans and determined that the ISU could afford to cut several hundred positions out of the plans. The ISU for its part was understandably taken aback because its planners had spent months refining the number of positions needed. Suffice it to say that the back and forth debating about the actual number of positions needed resulted in a change to the planned deployment figures. While there is a need to put checks and balances in place to ensure that efficiency and effectiveness are kept in balance it is also important that this happens regularly during the planning stage.

Another matter which deserves mention is the individual efforts made by planners and others within the ISU to realize savings on the purchase of goods and services wherever possible. In the course of our interviews, we learned of numerous instances where this occurred (amounting to savings in the millions of dollars). At the same time, a check on potential savings to be gained was helped by federal government practices and policies on securing goods and services and the associated procurement process. In this regard, the ISU had dedicated in-house procurement specialists with decades of experience in federal government procurement to ensure that purchasing respected a competitive bidding process and otherwise followed strict federal government spending guidelines and policies. Having to abide by federal government policies respecting procurement can be frustrating (especially when deadlines are short and specific requirements are unique and ad hoc) – in the case of the ISU that frustration was lessened significantly because they had experienced and very helpful procurement officials. It is ironic that these same procurement policies resulted in increases to spending as the ISU was prevented from accessing goods and services contracts that were equally transparent as those achieved through the government policies, but did not involve a competitive bid process.

The need to be attentive to ways of capturing savings takes on an added importance in light of the reality that, as was made clear through our interviews, some prospective goods and service providers appeared to view the Games as an opportunity to charge far more than would normally be seen as reasonable. Obviously, some of this opportunism can be avoided by virtue of the competitive bidding process in standard procurement practices, but as should be expected, there are times when goods and services need to be secured through a single or very limited number of suppliers. Ultimately, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to confirm exactly how much the ISU may have overpaid for certain goods and services. It is also difficult to fully understand how much the ISU might have been able to reduce costs had the requirements of its association with VANOC been different. Indeed, it becomes complicated when one organization has a dedicated supplier and an associated organization has little choice but to use that supplier. In our assessment, based on what we learned through our interviews, it would be fair to say that the ISU reluctantly paid more than a reasonable price for some goods and services.
On the other hand, it would also be fair to say that the collective financial impact of those arrangements was relatively insignificant in terms of the budget overall.

In terms of any additional measures that could have been taken to ensure costs were kept in check, we were often reminded in our interviews of the importance of completing tasks as early in the process as possible. As was pointed out numerous times, delays in the development of operational plans and subsequent changes to plans, often caused by the ISU planner’s dependency on VANOC to complete and commit to their plans and requirements, created situations where there was a risk of increased costs. In some instances costs did increase because of delays, including delays in obtaining funding approval. These types of delays result in reducing the options available and the maneuverability available in those options that in turn increase financial risk. Accordingly, everyone involved in the development of plans needs to be attentive to the potential financial consequences of delays.

One of the ways in which everyone can be kept attentive to costs is through on-going internal communication about financial issues and through specifically assigned responsibility for this oversight throughout all levels of management. In the case of the 2010 Winter Games, and the ISU specifically, the responsibility for finances was held only at the senior management level. It would have been helpful to have levels below senior management (i.e. team leaders) hold some budgetary responsibility as well. This shift would have provided yet another level of assurance that financial considerations were seriously considered in the development of plans and the interface of those plans with other security issues. Further, it would have been helpful to have an internal communication strategy that inspired cost saving initiatives from the ground up and highlighted the impact of delays on costs.

Equally significant as an internal communication mechanism is the need to have a communication strategy for interested parties external to the ISU. In the case of the 2010 Winter Games, as will be discussed in a later section, it was clear from the outset that the media had a persistent interest in the cost of providing security to the event. It should also have been clear that the media was not working with a full appreciation of all the facts. The end result was a series of negative media reports about the costs involved. It would seem reasonable that the result might have been different had the media been privy to all that was being done to guard against overspending and to generally ensure carefullness in spending overall. Further, increasing the understanding of the media with respect to the difference between indicative and substantive funding in the planning process may have thwarted some of the ill-informed media coverage.

Providing security information to the public is clearly a complicated issue because offering up any level of detail on security issues would pose serious risks to the security of future major events. As there were many stakeholders it would have been helpful if all partners including multiple levels of Government communicated the changes to the indicative costs associated with the work outputs of the planning stage. Ultimately, it is critical to be as transparent as possible about the financial affairs of any major event.

One of the most important lessons to be learned from the security planning experience for the 2010 Winter Games is that prior to the initiation phase a clearly understood financial responsibility matrix must be developed. In the case of the 2010 Winter Games, it was not clear in all cases what VANOC would be paying for and what the ISU would be paying for in terms of security costs. In the initial and preliminary planning stages from 2004 through 2007 agreements were based on the original Bid Book estimates, which at best discussed at a macro level the breakdown of responsibilities and associated shared costs. Greater clarity of mutual financial responsibilities was achieved in early 2008 with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the ISU and VANOC. However, neither of these two documents completely withstood the planning cycle as there were a number of instances where responsibilities had not been clearly assigned causing back and forth negotiations between the two
parties. Inevitably the negotiations resulted in the essential security requirements being acquired, more often than not at the expense of the ISU.

Finally, no discussion about finances associated to the planning and execution of major events would be complete without calling attention to the matter of threat level determination and what it means in terms of security costs. The cost of providing security for any major event is driven largely by a threat level established by organizers of the event. In the case of the 2010 Winter Games a threat level was established very early in the process and planning was conducted based on that level and with a view to providing some readiness to move to a higher level if needed or to scale back in some respects to a lower level if possible. At the same time though, as will be discussed later in this report, without benefit of specifics regarding the operational needs that accompany a particular threat level there is always the temptation to plan on the high side of whatever level is set and end up incurring more cost than actually necessary. There were no indications that this happened in the case of the 2010 Games, but it was clear that it could have happened in at least one instance had it not been for a senior ISU manager declining a request for the installation of pop-up barriers at a specific venue. The manager explained that the expense was not justified given intelligence information and the initial overall determination of threat. This decision saved taxpayers approximately $2,000,000.

Since essentially nothing of note happened in terms of security breaches at the Games, there will be some who wonder whether or not too much security was provided at the Games and thus whether or not too much money was spent on security. On the other hand, there will be those who believe that Canada simply got lucky, and that it would have been more prudent to plan and deliver security to a “high” level and spend substantially more money. In either case though, it is important to remember that the cost of security is largely a reflection of an initial planning decision concerning the perceived threat level. Once that decision about threat level is established, questions about whether or not too much money was spent should be focused around the degree to which planners and organizers provided security to that threat level in the most efficient manner possible. In the case of the 2010 Games, it is clear that security planners and organizers emphasized that orientation, and all things considered, were remarkably successful as evidenced by the relationship between the projected budget and the final cost total.

**Lessons Learned**

A financial responsibility matrix must be in place at the outset of the project.

A dedicated Director of Finance must be in place at the outset of the project.

Once approved by all concerned an effective and efficient internal and external financial communication strategy must be in place at the outset of the project.

Assume that many suppliers of goods and services will be inclined to charge the event more than they normally would to their clients generally.
Providing security for a major event requires staffing in two main areas: the planning and preparation of security, and the execution of those plans. In policing the 2010 Winter Games, these two tasks were handled by separate departments of the Integrated Security Unit: the Human Resources and Career Development team was responsible for the planning and preparation associated with the Games; while the Mobilization team was responsible for the actual mobilization of the security workforce. In staffing the functional areas to complete these two tasks, there needs to be a balancing of bringing in personnel who have many years of major event experience as well as those who will gain important experience that will benefit their respective policing organizations in the future.

Staffing the Workforce for Planning and Preparing the Security for a Major Event

In the years leading up to the 2010 Winter Games, the task of hiring the workforce needed to plan the event resided with the Human Resources and Career Development team. The lengthy lead up to the Games and the magnitude of the planning workforce presented this team with an enormous challenge. Those responsible for staffing the ISU started with no job descriptions and no template from which to work. Essentially, people were brought into the organization knowing the general direction and goal of the ISU, but without details on their roles and responsibilities.

Being an integrated unit, the ISU was staffed with people with a wide array of backgrounds from various policing agencies and external organizations. The job classifications were not based on rank, but were intended to be based on skills and experience. The expectation that rank would not factor into working relationships between job functions in an integrated unit posed considerable challenges, many of which may have been overcome by better incorporating rank and promotions into important planning positions in the organization. Admittedly, incorporating rank or promotions into the process may have added to the difficulty already inherent in competing with other policing units and functions for qualified personnel in the years prior to the Olympics. The personnel needed to plan and prepare for a major event must be taken from existing positions within other units or organizations; therefore, it is important to ensure that the candidates have the right skills and abilities to work within the fluid environment of major event planning. The key to the successful execution of many of the security plans for the Winter Games was having the right people in those important planning roles.

“First they asked me to make sure that staff deployed was truly representative of police across Canada, including police from 132 Municipal and Provincial departments. And then they asked me to make sure that 23% were bilingual. And then they asked me to make sure that their skill sets matched the skills required by their deployment”.

RCMP Inspector Barry Baxter, OIC Mobilization

The Human Resources and Career Development team hired more than 600 people for jobs within the ISU and had to plan for both the intake of the planning workforce and the exit strategy to decommission the organization at the conclusion of the Olympics. These tasks were largely successful, and the human resourcing plan will most certainly be used for future major events in Canada. In the end, after starting without job descriptions, 300 were developed to better articulate the roles and responsibilities associated with major events planning. The roles captured in these job descriptions included, but were not limited
to: training; mobilization of the security workforce; road-based transportation; technical operations; public affairs; community relations; physical security; exercise planning; securing internationally protected persons; information and technology support; the torch relay; accreditation; logistics; Paralympics planning; venue security planning; private security; and, project management. It is beyond the scope of this report to adequately describe all of the positions and responsibilities within the ISU; however, there is existing documentation compiled by the ISU that articulates in detail the many roles that must be filled to perform the security functions for a major event like the Winter Games. Suffice it to say, that a much repeated and emphasized theme throughout our interviews was the critical importance of detailed job descriptions being in place at the beginning of the planning for a major event.

Mobilizing the Security Workforce and Command Centre Staff

To police the 2010 Olympic Winter Games, the ISU mobilized a total workforce of more than 5,600 police officers from across Canada. These police officers were meant to fill positions as outlined in the Olympic security plans for the multiple venues, command centres, and specialized support units. The responsibility for filling these positions, mobilizing all of the necessary policing resources from across the country, scheduling their travel, and planning their shifts resided in the Mobilization unit of the ISU. An additional force of 950 police officers had to be arranged as a contingency force that could be deployed to the Games within 72 hours if they were needed.

The challenges associated with ensuring that the security unit represented the RCMP’s commitment to the Olympics being ‘Canada’s Games’ were numerous. The officer in charge of mobilization had to develop a national strategy that emphasized proportional and equitable representation in the security force. Furthermore, the mobilization plan had to ensure bilingual representation. The Mobilization unit worked with various levels of government to acquire the necessary workforce. In addition to mobilizing policing personnel from Canada’s national police force and provincial police forces, contracts were signed to include officers from 118 of the 132 municipal police forces in the country. According to the results of the workforce survey, 68% of the security workforce consisted of police officers and employees of the RCMP. The remaining respondents were members of municipal and provincial police forces, and other groups such as Sheriffs and the Correctional Service of Canada. The fact that so many police officers from different policing agencies were brought together to secure the Games was a monumental achievement, and a major legacy of the event.

By any measure the task was incredibly complicated. The Mobilization team had to arrange for the air travel for each attending officer, the scheduling of each officer, and the transportation of the officers’ equipment (uniforms and service weapons). These tasks were further complicated because of the more than 3000 personnel and consequent flight changes. Notably, many of those changes were required in the weeks leading up to the opening of the games. As a result, schedules had to be re-arranged which was further complicated because some changes fell within the 28-day RCMP notification of deployment policy. Specifically, organizational policy requires each officer to be notified of details 28 days in advance of deployment. These challenges were again magnified when it was determined five months prior to commencement of the Games that 200 positions had been cut. Ensuring that enough resources are dedicated to the task of mobilizing the workforce is critical to reducing the impact of some of these challenges. Importantly, mobilization represents an excellent example of the need for a detailed options analysis to explore “build” options as well as “buy” options2.

Although the security workforce was comprised of police personnel running the spectrum of ranks, the

2 With “build” referring to fulfilling the role in-house and “buy” referring to entering into a service contract.
majority of security positions were not filled based on the person’s specific skill sets. There are some obvious potential problems with this approach that were present during the 2010 Olympic deployment. In combination with training organizers, the Mobilization team designed and conducted a survey to determine what necessary specialized skills were available within the workforce. Using the data, a concerted effort was made to fill roles with people who already possessed the required knowledge and abilities, primarily as a way to utilize the wide array of skills within the workforce and reduce the need for specialized training.

The work assignments for those who participated in the security operation for the Games ranged from providing general security duties in and around venues to commanding the Theatre Command Centre. Work assignments within venues included, but were not limited to: Venue Commanders, Deputy Commanders, and Watch Commanders; Administrative NCOs; supervisors; Venue Operations Advisors and assistants; security generalists; vehicle operators (snowmobiles, ATVs, bicycles, etc.); skiers; wilderness patrol; and, vehicle screening. Jobs within the command centres included: Commanders, Deputy Commanders, and Watch Commanders; Operations Officers; Legal Officer; Liaison Officers; Air Services; scribes; file management coordinators; planners; and analysts. Work assignments in other support roles included: specialized response team members; police dog service members; marine operators; pilots; in-transit security; traffic service members and analysts; technical operations installers; monitors; and member support personnel. Those roles with command and management responsibilities were generally filled with regard to rank and past experience, while non-command roles were filled with a broad array of police personnel of ranks ranging from Constable to Inspector to Assistant Commissioner.

Due to the importance of securing a major event, there can be a tendency to want to fill all of the important positions with senior personnel who bring with them the previous experience that is critical to performing key roles. These people are invaluable to and often hold high ranks within their respective organizations. However, in order to maintain a high level of major event experience within policing organizations, the task of staffing important positions in both planning and operations requires balancing the present and future needs of policing organizations. Therefore, incorporating personnel with less experience into learning and developmental roles allows for the transmission of vital knowledge and experience from those in key leadership positions in the hope of developing future leaders. This was one of the key considerations when filling positions in the ISU for the 2010 Olympics.

The development of less experienced personnel was facilitated within the ISU by filling positions without rank requirements. While this may have resulted in some confusion in terms of authority and responsibilities, it did allow personnel with different levels of experience to work together in teams toward shared goals. For that reason, major event planning provides an excellent opportunity to develop important planning skills within an organization. Furthermore, by providing training opportunities and ensuring basic competencies, even less experienced personnel should be able to learn on the job and contribute to the success of the operation. On the other hand, rank and experience were necessary components of the selection process for leadership roles for the operational phase. The creation of positions in which Non-Commissioned officers (NCOs) could work in the Command Centres along with commissioned officers helped to facilitate the development of important knowledge within the organization. This development of major event knowledge and experience was another important legacy of this large security operation.

Perhaps the most important aspect of mobilization is that it requires an assumption that non-stop change of previous deployment arrangements is inevitable. In the case of the 2010 Winter Olympic Games, the Mobilization unit was under-staffed. There needs to
be a specific attention paid to communicating the details and reasons for change to deployed officers. Complaints about mobilization would have been reduced dramatically if those complaining had a more accurate understanding of the challenges faced by the Mobilization unit. Beyond that, a system should be in place to ensure effective communication between mobilization and other aspects of planning with a much stronger interface with the logistics team.

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**Lessons Learned**

- Job descriptions with associated responsibilities and skill sets should be in place at the outset of the project.
- Emphasize getting the right people in the right roles.
- Expect and plan for non-stop change regarding mobilization.
The primary responsibility of the Community Relations Group (CRG) was to engage with key community stakeholders regarding security-related concerns for the Games. The obvious goal of this work was to minimize the number and nature of contentious issues and situations that would inevitably arise given the magnitude of the Games. The fundamental strategy to achieve this goal was informed by the following key elements: 1) Development of clear, consistent and trustworthy lines of communication; 2) Early and comprehensive engagement with key stakeholders in the host communities; 3) Development and articulation of clear messages with external audiences with respect to the information-sharing nature of the community relations function as opposed to it being a consultative process; 4) Identification of three core interest groups (activists and protestors, business and local community, and Aboriginal groups) and assignment of a lead within the CRG to each group; 5) Development of a human resources plan that identified staff members who had local knowledge of the key social, political, economic tensions being raised in anticipation of the Games; 6) Emphasizing mobility and unlike other functional areas, treating the venue/urban divide as porous to heighten the real and perceived sense of stakeholders with respect to the responsiveness of the ISU, through the CRG, to their concerns.

In many ways, the CRG simply continued the strong commitment of the RCMP to the importance of community relations work in relation to major events that has its roots in the model that originated at the G8 summit held in 2002 in Kananaskis. According to a number of participants, it was at Kananaskis that the importance of meaningful community relations, as opposed to well composed public relations messages began to be understood more broadly as a central and foundational component of providing security for a major event.

There were four key themes that consistently arose in conversations about the role of community relations: integrating the CRG within the command structure; maintaining the distinction between the goals and functions of Community Relations and that of Public Affairs; the importance of local knowledge and understanding of the legacy value of the relationships developed; and, developing more effective mechanisms to share timely and accurate information with key stakeholders.

“Police showed commendable restraint in dealing with protesters… The success of the Games demonstrates the importance of being prepared when it comes to major events and protests”.

Dr. Michael Byers, Political Science Professor, University of British Columbia

An overarching philosophical and operational approach to all areas of the ISU was the differentiation and ultimately transition from the planning phase to the execution phase. However, unlike so many other areas, CRG required an uninterrupted flow of information and continuity of messaging and personnel that was outside this more dichotomous model of before and during the Games. While there did not appear to be any disagreement about the need for continuity as the CRG worked with key stakeholder groups before and during the Games, a key practical challenge quickly surfaced as the command structure was installed and became operational. While the C2 plan had the CRG reporting to Gold Command, it appeared that operationally the CRG needed to have a mechanism or position that could liaise more directly with the Venue Commanders as they responded to what were more venue-specific community relations issues.
There were a number of comments that pointed to a persistent frustration that so much of the ground work completed in advance of the Games with business and community groups was threatened and sometimes undone by Venue Commanders not accessing the CRG as a resource as situations arose in and around the venues.

A second major theme revolved around the challenges associated with maintaining the community relations mandate in the face of pressure to engage in more public relations type activities (e.g. acting as media contacts). According to the ISU C2 CONOPS Plan, the Public Affairs unit had two primary functions that were organized around the principles of “centralized messaging” and only commenting on issues that relate to the ISU’s mandate. Clearly, community relations activities are not organized around message management, but rather they are based on relationship development achieved primarily through the sharing of meaningful, accurate and timely information. It was the impression of members of the CRG that this critical differentiation in role and responsibilities was being collapsed under the umbrella of Public Affairs in the model being employed for G8 and G20 in June 2010. All evidence from this evaluation would suggest that abandoning the model of a separate and responsive CRG would immediately and negatively impact the ability of members to function effectively to minimize community-based tensions that may impact the security of any major event.

A third theme that surfaced in the interviews was the importance of paying attention to the need to use personnel who had current local knowledge of the explicit and implicit social, economic, and political tensions in the host communities when forming any CRG. Aside from the obviously practical reasons for this strategy, an appreciation for the legacy of the relations developed in anticipation of and during the Games informed this principle of staffing.

Finally, while the C2 plan articulated strategies to share information with key stakeholders there was a clear and consistent message from interviewees that in practical terms, this was a major source of frustration for both the CRG and for those community members and groups seeking clarity on everything from road closures to fence lines. It is this latter example that most clearly exemplifies the challenges faced by the CRG and indeed the ISU as it tried to keep the public generally and key stakeholders more specifically, informed.

The challenges associated with sharing information about the fence lines are typical of other examples that surfaced during the Games. In some cases, the CRG was actively trying to attain the information regarding the security footprint and it was simply not finalized for public consumption. In other cases the CRG found itself having to aggressively present the case for disseminating information that community members needed but that security stakeholders, internal and external to the ISU, were resisting the release of because of perceived sensitivities with respect to security information.

It is more than fair to say that all four of these themes represented both challenges and examples of successes of the CRG and that while the specific nature and magnitude of any major event will shift the emphasis and strategies utilized by a CRG, the model employed at the Winter Games represents a best practice approach to community relations.

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**Lessons Learned**

Integrate the CRG within the C2 model.

Emphasize the significance of the philosophical and operational distinction between Community Relations and Public Affairs.

Operationally acknowledge the importance of local knowledge and the legacy of relations.

Develop mechanisms to share timely, accurate and meaningful information with key stakeholders.
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence is the single most important component in preparing for and responding to security-related threats for any given major event. More specifically, intelligence refers to the process of establishing and monitoring security threats to the Games. Importantly, it is this intelligence and the subsequent threat assessments that drive both the level and the nature of security required to provide a safe and secure event.

“If something is going to happen at the Games, the police already know about it”.

FBI Agent – talking to the Canadian press prior to the Games

There are multiple agencies sharing responsibility in assessing threat to public safety including Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces (DND/CF), Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA), and the RCMP. As such, there exists a well established method of handling intelligence and generating threat reports within the intelligence community. While a major event such as the Olympics may generate a threat, the reality is that threats to national security exist and are monitored on an ongoing basis. The cornerstone of the intelligence function for the Winter Games was forming an intelligence group that drew upon existing expertise and resources in a manner which would facilitate a responsive, effective intelligence infrastructure. To make this possible, a model to facilitate the communication among the multiple agencies with a stake in intelligence, as it related to the Games was required. For the ISU, this model was known as the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG). The JIG processes and functions that were in place prior to the G8 Summit in 2002 and that were further refined for that event, were the basis for the model employed at the Winter Games. Importantly, this model has also been employed in planning for the G8 and G20 meetings being held in Ontario in June 2010. According to the ISU Concept of Operations (2009), the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) was built to act as an interface between the Games command structure and the existing intelligence infrastructure. The focus was collating the collected intelligence of multiple agencies such as CSIS, CBSA, and the RCMP as it related to the security of the Games, and then providing intelligence to the planners and commanders of the ISU through its ability to assess threat levels and generate briefings for the ISU command prior to and during the Games.

It is important to emphasize that due to the nature of intelligence the group responsible for this function for any major event must build upon existing intelligence business lines and be started well in advance of the planning stages of the major event. In the case of the JIG, intelligence started to be gathered as early as six years prior to the Games.

It is exceedingly difficult to assess the resource requirements and the success of an intelligence group; however, it seems fair to say that the JIG effectively provided the information necessary for the ISU to respond to the security issues associated with the Games. Incidentally, in the survey conducted as part of this project, 88% of the law enforcement personnel responsible for working at the Games felt that the venues at the Games were a safe place for them to be working.

Furthermore, while one of the challenges the JIG faced was the apparent need for better communication, communicating threat levels is not a simple matter. While on the surface it may seem to be a straightforward function of classifying information into a Low, Medium or High threat level, a combination of the physical event area, the changing situation around the world and the level of internationally protected persons (IPP) attending,  

all need to be individually and then collectively considered. For example, it could be determined that a venue was a low-risk to attract a major threat to security; however, a visit from a high-risk target such as the President of the United States would immediately impact that assessment. Not only do venue resources need to be scalable to possible shifts in threat requirements, command resources need to be scalable according to which IPP attends which venues. Communicating this in a briefing to event planners is a fundamentally important yet incredibly complex task, particularly given some of the sensitivities associated with the dissemination of intelligence information.

One of the most significant challenges facing any intelligence-centered agency or group is the tendency to be overly concerned with “the need to know” sometimes to the detriment of effectively sharing intelligence information. This long standing issue for intelligence groups is well documented4, 5, 6, 7 and was a fully anticipated challenge for the JIG and consequently the entire command structure. While one of the main responsibilities of the JIG was to provide commanders with briefings regarding the meaning of these threat levels, a number of ISU planners and commanders reported being unfamiliar with these threat levels. Furthermore, ISU planners developed plans that paid little or no attention to the fluidity needed to respond to a potential change in threat levels. With the exception of Informatics, it would seem that the JIG could have done more to ensure that the ISU planners and commanders were adequately briefed regarding the nature of the threat relating to the Games and its relationship to planning.

While the primary challenge faced by the JIG seemed to be ensuring planners understood the known threat levels, communicating this information should have taken place earlier than was the case at the ISU. Clearly defined threat levels directly impact the entire structure and cost of securing a major event and must therefore be accessible to event planners as early as possible.

One final challenge of note was the JIG Commander’s idea to reposition analysts into support functions given that the role of the JIG was not to act as its own intelligence agency, but rather to coordinate and disseminate the intelligence shared by multiple agencies.

While it is fair to say that in the future the JIG needs to be more attentive to communicating threat levels, ultimately, those providing intelligence are not the ones deciding how to use the information. There is a natural inclination of people to think in terms of higher, rather than lower levels of risk. Therefore, it is critical that those responsible for acting on the intelligence information provided must be positioned in terms of experience, expertise, and leadership style to make intelligence-based decisions.

**Lessons Learned**

_Start with a well developed, articulated threat matrix with scalable and built in operational options._

_Clear communication of threat levels to planners is essential._

_As much as possible, leverage existing intelligence and associated infrastructure/processes._

_Resist the temptation to inflate threat risks._
Policing a major security event on the scale of the 2010 Winter Games requires more than simply bringing in a large enough security workforce to perform the necessary security functions during the event. Many of the security functions require equipment, transportation, and an accreditation process. In addition to these on the job necessities, any deployed workforce requires accommodation for the duration of their deployment. Also, as was the case during the Winter Games, the security workforce may need to be augmented by a private security workforce to fulfill additional security and screening roles. Ensuring that these support functions are properly handled requires a great deal of planning and coordination, and is integral to the success of the security operation.

“Start early, start early, start early”

ISU Planner

This section outlines the challenges and successes of the planning process for accommodating the police security workforce, ensuring accreditation for those needing access during the Games, hiring the private security workforce, procuring and securing transport for police, athletes, and important visitors, and providing the necessary equipment to perform all of the security functions.

Accommodations for the Security Workforce

Policing a major event such as the Winter Games presents a unique challenge in terms of accommodating the security workforce. Even in a major city such as Vancouver, British Columbia, those planning accommodation for the security workforce had to compete with a finite number of accommodations which was magnified by the needs of VANOC and the many visitors to the Olympics. Specifically, while there were 25,000 hotel rooms in the Lower Mainland of BC, 2500 of these rooms were deemed to be unsuitable, 2500 were held by the hotels for their best corporate clients, and 12,000 were held by VANOC to accommodate Olympic Officials (Olympic family etc.). This left 7000 rooms available, but it was also clear that at least all of that number would be needed to accommodate Games visitors. These realities were further complicated by the events taking place in more than one geographic location, necessitating security in and around both Vancouver and Whistler. Considering the large number of people that would require accommodation and the increased demand for accommodation in and around the areas hosting major events such as the Olympic Games, the challenge of accommodating a large security workforce should be approached early and with a realistic expectation of the potential costs.

During the Winter Games, planners in charge of logistics for the Integrated Security Unit had to find a feasible alternative to hotels to accommodate the security workforce. The decision was made to contract three accommodation vessels that were normally used for holiday cruises to provide rooms and meals for the majority of the security workforce working in and around Vancouver. In Whistler, accommodations were generally rented houses and chalets. Based on the results of a survey of the security workforce, 88% of respondents resided in the accommodation vessels in Vancouver, while the remainder was housed in hotels, rented houses and chalets, and other temporary accommodations for the duration of their deployment. Finding accommodation for such a large security workforce amidst the high demand for rooms during the Olympic Games required approximately 90% of respondents to share accommodation with at least one other person. Despite the fact that sharing accommodation was not an ideal situation, 64% of respondents indicated that they were satisfied or very satisfied overall with their accommodations.
Since the quality of accommodation may be a key factor contributing to the morale of the workforce over the course of a long deployment, the importance of securing accommodation early enough in the planning process should be emphasized. Ensuring clear definitions for the roles and responsibilities of the contracting and technical authorities early in the process will result in less confusion during the contracting process.

In the planning for the Games, the original bid budget significantly underestimated the costs associated with accommodating the security workforce and relied on those figures until too late in the process substantially delayed the accommodation acquisition process and resulted in reduced options and higher overall costs. Although accommodation options are largely dependent on the location of the major event in question, it is probable that, with a large security workforce, innovative alternatives will be necessary. Having the capacity to deal with the issues early enough and with a realistic expectation of costs will help to overcome the challenges of accommodating a large workforce.

The officer survey results would indicate that most officers were satisfied with their accommodation; however, there was considerable and consistent dissatisfaction with the double-bunking that characterized much of the accommodation on the cruise ships. It is one thing to ask someone to double bunk for a few days, but it is yet another to expect someone to do this for as long as these officers were required to do it (23 days on average). Even worse, it is unrealistic to expect them to double bunk in such extremely close quarters.

Accreditation

Policing a major event necessitates that authorized people have access to the event without sacrificing security. To enable efficient access for those authorized people, an accreditation process is required to ensure that those requesting access do not pose a risk to the overall security of the event. One aspect of the role of the ISU during the lead up to the Games was to provide background checks and make recommendations to the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC), who had the final decision on whether to provide accreditation.

The accreditation process was a complex task resulting in approximately 182,000 people being checked on 17 different ‘characteristics’ through six different databases. In total, 105,000 people were accredited through the process. Background checks for accreditation for the Games were completed through what was called Security Accreditation Management Systems (SAMS). Those who worked with SAMS recommended that working with the technical support personnel to ensure a tested and proved system would have improved the ability to handle the large workload. As well, the early planning approach that identified as many as 42 personal specifications for accreditation checks had to be refined, ultimately causing some delay. Settling technical issues and background check requirements early in the process would allow for more time for the processing of accreditation requests. However, despite the scope of the task, strong working relationships among all of the stakeholders were critical to the success of the accreditation process.

Private Security

Securing the Games required an additional private security force to run the pedestrian screening areas for venues. The goal of securing the events had to be balanced with the need to facilitate the safe entry of spectators to the different sporting events. The responsibility for hiring and training the private security force, determining how to screen spectators and what to screen for, and planning the process for the completion of these functions rested with the Private Security Coordinator within the ISU. Since the hiring of private security is not a typical task undertaken by police, this process presented many challenges, not only in terms of the actual procurement of the private security function, but also in integrating the private workforce into the existing security plans.
The hiring process for private security for the Games involved essentially creating a private security force of 6,000 employees. Without an adequate understanding of what hiring on this scale involved, the requirements of the process were greatly underestimated. The hiring and managing of the security force was contracted out to a private company; however, the costs for the services were higher than anticipated, and assumed by the ISU instead of VANOC as originally anticipated. Overall, the hiring process was a more significant undertaking than had been expected; however, it appears that the contract company and its employees were able to fulfill their mandate. It should be emphasized that if a future event requires an additional security force, the involvement and time required to acquire this capability must not be underestimated.

Although the private security force worked well overall, there were important lessons learned about the integration of a private workforce into the security plans for a major event. First, is the need for the coordinating body (the ISU) to have the capacity to test the functions performed by the private security force. In the case of the Games, the private security force was responsible for pedestrian screening; however, the RCMP conducted a quality assurance program of the screening to allow for problems to be detected and improvements to be made. This quality assurance program was an important success in the overall security process, and the use of such a program in future security settings would be beneficial in determining whether or not existing security screening practices are effective.

Moreover, the monitoring of the private security force allowed for the identification of two key human resource issues within the personnel. First, the universal plan for screening visitors to the Games was not being used consistently across venues, causing confusion within the private security force in terms of how to maintain access control. To combat this problem, it was recommended that a single person be put in charge of access control for the entire operation to ensure that venue commanders did not adopt different practices for each venue as they responded to the competing pressures of security and visitor convenience. The second issue involved the private security force losing motivation when they perceived that the police security force may not have always valued the role of pedestrian screening. It became evident that improvements could be made to the quality of screening by ensuring that police personnel worked more closely with private security in part to demonstrate that they took their role seriously. This action by the police greatly influenced the motivational level of the private security force. Despite the general belief among law enforcement that police and private security do not function well together, within the Olympic security environment, the working relations between police and private security during the 2010 Games appeared to be a major success.

**Transportation**

Since the 2010 Olympic Winter Games involved numerous venues in and around Vancouver and Whistler, another issue faced by security planners was to not only ensure that there was transportation for the security workforce, athletes, and other important visitors, but also to ensure the safety of those using the transportation. In general, the transportation was contracted out to a private company to provide buses and shuttles to transport people from one venue to another. It was the role of the Road Based Transportation Unit (RBTU) to secure the vehicles and attempt to manage traffic in such a way as to guarantee safe and effective transportation between venues. At no point was the magnitude of this task more obvious than in preparation for the open and closing ceremonies.

One aspect of maintaining safe transportation for athletes was the ‘sanitization’ of transport vehicles. This process involved searching the interior and exterior of the buses prior to their use to prevent the risk of an incident occurring in transit or a dangerous item entering into secure venues. To ensure the buses were constantly secure after ‘sanitization’, the vehicles
had to be monitored during transit between secured locations. There were two sanitization stations for all of the buses, one located in Vancouver, the other in Whistler. These facilities used under-carriage cameras and teams of police personnel to sweep the buses. Electronically monitoring the location of the buses at all times allowed for security to ensure ‘sanitized’ buses remained secure.

While not a function of RBTU, transportation was also needed for the security workforce to travel to and from their work assignments. Overall, 76% of survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they were satisfied with travel to and from their work assignment. However, there were recommendations that a capacity for small group self-transport should have been available in those cases where shuttles were late or inefficient. In general, the challenges of transportation were overcome through planning efforts that focused on achieving a safe and secure transit system. Especially in a city that is prone to traffic problems, having a preparedness to manage traffic around and in between venues is of critical importance to securing a major event. Of course, traffic plans rely, to a large degree, on the willingness of the citizens of the city to obey new traffic rules, which was a major success during the Games.

Equipment and Supplies

Securing a major event, specifically one on the scale of the Games, requires a great deal of equipment. Although some of that equipment is used for traditional policing and can be brought in from within the policing community, many of the necessary items must be obtained through other means. While police forces may have access to boats, all-terrain vehicles, snow mobiles, bicycles, and other equipment that are required for policing activities, equipment such as x-ray machines for screening, surveillance cameras, and other security equipment are likely less available within regular policing resources. In any major security event, there will be a need to obtain these types of equipment, track them while they are in use, and manage them at the end of the event.

Based on the interviews of planners, the equipment obtained to secure the 2010 Olympics generally represented a successful process, but there were some important issues that arose. As occurred during the planning for securing the 2010 Olympics, major event planners may be approached by security equipment companies trying to sell their equipment with the belief that the security organization has access to near unlimited funding. It is therefore important that operators identify their requirements as early as possible, conduct options analysis of what will satisfy the requirements then allow the procurement process to move forward in accordance with Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) and Treasury Board policy and procedures. Options analysis may include purchasing equipment and either keeping it within the organization or selling it at the conclusion of the event, or for those items that are not normally used for policing, the option of renting equipment may prove more beneficial, since technology has a distinct shelf-life and may be obsolete by the time it is needed for a similar major event in the future. Most importantly, some planners suggested that a major events planning process be developed with the objective of clarifying the procedure to identify and procure equipment in a timely manner in accordance with existing PWGSC and Treasury Board directives.

It is also important to have a process in place to track equipment to ensure there is a clear system of accountability8. The enormity of the task of securing a major event means that equipment will likely be transferred around the Theatre of Operations. Along with general use, the transfer of equipment increases the chances of equipment being damaged or going missing. Furthermore, a large security workforce consisting of people from various police forces will likely be familiar with different ways of managing equipment. It is important to use a single materials

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8 See the Major Events Management of Assets (MEMA) functions for further explanation.
management system for tracking equipment, and
to ensure those in charge of the system are able to
work with it. Therefore, the system should be agreed
upon with enough time for proper training and
implementation of the system.

A great deal of planning and preparation went into
ensuring the necessary operational support functions
were in place for the 2010 Olympic Games security
operation. Planners were tasked with finding
accommodations for a security workforce of more
than 5,600 police personnel, running background
checks on 182,000 people, hiring a private security
force numbering around 6,000, safely transporting
the athletes, important visitors, and the security
workforce, and obtaining and tracking all of the
necessary equipment for the operation. While there
is clearly a need to have earlier and more detailed
planning with options analyses that incorporates risk
factors and associated responses, the dedication and
hard work put toward the planning for these support
functions was integral to the success of the Olympic
security operation.

Lessons Learned

It is important to start as early as possible to plan operational support
functions and commence procurement activities.

The nature and extent of the tasks to be accomplished must be clear
and well articulated.

Planners must be aware of standardized policies and procedures.
The Informatics team at the ISU was responsible for providing technological support, computer software and hardware, communications infrastructure (radio networks, telephone systems, etc) and networks (LAN support, running cables, etc). The Officer in Charge of the Informatics team was responsible for building an informatics organization in support of the Integrated Security Unit and Joint Intelligence Group, including all physical and human resources. The organizational concept of grouping all of the technological aspects of security together is logical given their inter-dependence on one another.

“When it comes to IT there is always a pressure to conform to what a supplier wants to provide. The focus must stay on the ability of the supplier fit to your requirements.”

ISU Planner

The issue of planning operations in anticipation of fluid threat levels is a major theme in this report and it is therefore interesting to note that of all the planners interviewed, only the informatics planners emphasized the importance of planning technological infrastructure responsive to the threat levels identified by the Joint Intelligence Group. Not only was this connection between informatics and the JIG conceptually established, the Informatics team created plans in response to any given threat level unlike any other functional area within the ISU.

One of the clear highlights produced by the Informatics Team was the creation of the Integrated Security Olympic Network (ISON). This network was one of the first of its kind in Canada for a number of reasons, including its ability to share files and information up to Protected “B”, across multiple agencies in compliance with all relevant federal standards. When major events occur, there is a plethora of documents and information that need to be shared across agencies, and having a network that enables this sharing of information, in a manner consistent with all federal regulations, greatly streamlines the entire process. Given this observation, it was ironic that communication between agencies was also one of the most significant challenges faced by the Informatics team. Informatics is dependent on external agencies to facilitate its operations; unfortunately, it would seem that relationships between Informatics and these partnering agencies were often a source of frustration. For example, the unit responsible for physically running the network cables around the venues had to work with VANOC in the venues; the unit responsible for creating the Event Management System (EMS) had to work with the Chief Information Officer in Ottawa. While the specifics of these frustrations varied according to the unit and partnering agency, a consistent theme was the need for more clarity with respect to roles and responsibilities earlier in the planning process. This organizational challenge is not unique to informatics; however, in this case, it had a profound effect on the overall cost of providing the required technology, how effectively the technology worked, and even how satisfied users were with the technology they were presented with.

The issue of the satisfaction of individuals using the systems created by the Informatics team was informed in part by disagreements in distinguishing what was important to “build” and what was more reasonable to “buy”. For example, one of the systems the Informatics team was requested to provide was a geo-spatial component capable of using electronic maps to identify the location of a given event. There are multiple computer programs that are available for purchase that have this capability that are widely used around the world (e.g. ESRI’s GIS program, Google Earth). Yet, there was a decision made that this capability should be built, rather than bought, by the ISU Informatics team, and that it would be a module included in the much
larger Event Management System (EMS) that was being built to support all major events planning and operations. There was technical synergy of building the module rather than buying it as a stand alone capability that would then need to be adapted to EMS, bringing with it its own technical challenges. However, the impact of this decision, given the time constraints, available resources and expertise, was the creation of a module that when reviewed by the operator was shown to not yet be adequate to the task. This necessitated the ISU to procure a system to meet its operational capability for the Games. When considering build or buy options it is important to ensure that there is enough time and technical capability within the organization to make any build decisions to be the most effective and efficient options available.

**Lessons Learned**

- Informatics requests must have proper associated operational needs.
- Utilize a stand-alone network.
- Ensure that a procurements option is included in all requirements analyses.
- Ensure informatics plans conform to user requirements (resist the reverse).
- A detailed informatics plan with a comprehensive options analysis is critical.
Exercises, in the context of major events, involve practicing both the planned procedures and the execution of the plan prior to the actual event. Establishing exercises to test operational plans is essential in highlighting the aspects of the plan that are working effectively as well as those components that need to be modified. It follows that exercising a plan or model of response as early as possible in the planning process is critical to the ability of planners to use the information accrued through the exercise. The results generated from exercises not only help to modify potential short-comings of security measures, but extend to possibly influencing everything from identified resource requirements to financial costs. In short, exercises should be considered one of the most important components in planning a major event.

“Earlier today the President led a Cabinet-level exercise to discuss preparedness, crisis response and incident-management procedures for the upcoming 2010 Vancouver Olympics … Just as the President has participated in exercises before focused on hurricanes, mock terrorist attacks and earthquakes, the President wanted to see first-hand the prudent work being done to prepare for the Winter Olympics in Canada.”

Nicholas Shapiro, White House Spokesperson

It is interesting to note that exercises are not traditionally a part of the RCMP model of training personnel. The RCMP traditionally trains members in a particular job, and then pending certification, releases the members to start working. Thus, when the RCMP take the lead role in planning the security for a major event, such as the case with the Integrated Security Unit and the Games, it is not necessarily a given that exercises will be naturally factored into the operational roll-out of the planning process. It may seem obvious that the planning requirements for a major event varies by the size and scope of the event, but in the case of an event such as the Olympics, the planning requirements necessitated an organization (the ISU) of its own. Given the integration of all of the functional areas of operations, an exercise team made up of planners tasked with exercises was established. In the case of the ISU, the exercise team was formed in March 2008 and consisted of seven key individuals. Importantly, the role of the exercise team is not to create individual exercises, but rather to facilitate and coordinate the multiple exercises brought forward by the individual teams within the ISU, as well as the external partnering agencies. The final advantage of this exercise team model is the ability to help the multiple planners identify and analyze any possible change requirements in a coordinated fashion. It is critical that these proposed changes are then communicated in a timely and meaningful manner so that the senior management and the team leaders associated with any major event can make informed decisions.

The framework within which the exercise team operated necessitated that there were two intersecting realms to be exercised. The first, under the control of the Privy Council Office (PCO) was primarily external provincial and federal partner agencies such as BC Hydro, individual municipalities, and provincial emergency services and involved the PCO controlling the budget, planning and execution of three exercises — Bronze, Silver and Gold. The second realm involved the ISU Exercise team planning, developing and leading the ISU and its key stakeholders through what was referred to as the “Pegasus Guardian” series
of exercises, as well as numerous other table top, and functional training exercises.

Ultimately, the goal of the Exercise team was to the extent possible exercise the 48 plans and 110 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that had been produced within ISU as well as the plans of integrated external partners as they related to the possible threat to security being considered in planning. While it would seem that the plans produced internally were not as timely as they needed to be, it is not an exaggeration to say that the external agencies were not able to bring any meaningful plans to the table.

While the objective of the Exercise team was to plan over-arching ISU exercises to integrate the various plans of action, exercising specific plans of action was the responsibility of the respective planning units. It was evident that there was inadequate attention paid to the need to exercise plans specific to particular functional areas. It would seem reasonable that a greater emphasis on more micro level exercises might have highlighted the need for the more timely completion of plans.

It seems very clear that the Exercise team should have reduced the emphasis placed on exercising major catastrophes and increased its attention to more likely events such as the late arrival of a motorcade or a lost child. It seemed that there were few (if any) exercises executed to cover the mundane events. This being said, this concern could be partially addressed by ensuring individual units understand that their role includes relevant exercises as it is arguable that practicing routine events in a venue could be the responsibility of a Venue Commander. However, their ability to influence the design of exercises was somewhat limited by the fact that the ISU Pegasus Guardian series of exercises was linked to the PCO exercise planning effort, which was designed to test worse case, whole of Government scenarios. Of course there is a clear need to have a clear understanding of what to do should a catastrophic event take place, but attention to this should be guided by known intelligence to threat levels.

Lessons Learned

Exercises should be considered one of the most important components in planning and preparing for a major event.

While exercising the catastrophic is necessary, exercising the routine is equally necessary.

Planning deadlines associated with exercises must be enforced.

Develop a support mechanism to encourage partners to produce plans.
As has been expressed in previous sections of this report, staffing the security component of a major event on the scale of the Olympic Games is an undertaking rife with challenges. In addition to enlisting enough police and other security personal and mobilizing that security workforce from all across Canada, there were many other concerns that naturally accompanied such a large-scale, long-term deployment. Those planning for this event were aware that there would be difficulties facing a workforce that was living and working away from their families and their home detachments for several weeks; however, the impact of this type of deployment on a police workforce had not been previously documented. This section of the report discusses the effects of this type of major event deployment on the policing personnel who are brought in to provide security for the Games.

“I enjoyed the opportunity to have been there, the experience and esprit de corps I was able to acquire from the Members of forces from across the country who attended. It was an opportunity I will value and remember for the years to come.”

Municipal police officer from Ontario

The primary source of information used to explore these issues was a survey of police personnel who participated in the security workforce for the 2010 Olympic Winter Games. The survey asked respondents to provide feedback about their opinions and experiences with regard to their work assignments, living accommodations, and the impact of the deployment on their home lives. For the purpose of this section, the focus will be placed on those factors that may have played a role in making the work assignment more or less enjoyable, and those factors that were associated with responses that indicated a person would volunteer to participate again in a major security event. It is important to recognize that while managing the challenges of participating in the policing of this major event, the large security force was integral to the overall success of Canada’s Olympic experience.

Home Responsibilities of the Security Workforce

The security workforce was comprised of police officers from across Canada and in order to provide security for the Olympics, these police officers had to leave their home lives and put on hold their work at their home police departments. These responsibilities do not disappear during the weeks leading up to and during deployment and being absent can present considerable challenges for those within a security workforce.

When assembling such a large security workforce, it is inevitable that important policing resources are going to be drawn from their respective departments, leaving those police forces under increased strain throughout the deployment. From the sample of the police personnel who responded to the survey, nearly half (48%) were constables, while the other half was made up of other non-commissioned officers, civilians, a small number of commissioned officers, and other ranks. In general, the police personnel were very experienced with 61% of the workforce sample having more than 10 years service. This means that not only were a large number of policing resources temporarily removed from police work across Canada, but also that many were taken from leadership or specialized roles.

In addition to being police personnel, the security workforce was naturally made up of people with family and social responsibilities. The gender distribution of respondents consisted of approximately 80% males and 20% females. More than 90% of respondents indicated that they were involved in a committed relationship.
Furthermore, the majority (67%) of respondents indicated that they had at least one dependant. Given the average age of the respondents was 41.5 years with a range from early 20s to mid 60s, those dependants included both children under the age of 18 and adults. The majority of respondents (52%) reported having at least one dependant under the age of 18, while 30% indicated they had at least one dependant over age 18. It is important to recognize that a large-scale and long-term security deployment for a major event like the Olympics will affect a large number of police personnel and their families.

Fortunately, despite these challenges, many of the people who made up the security workforce volunteered to participate. When asked in the survey, 75% of respondents indicated that they had volunteered to participate in the security workforce for the 2010 Olympics. This finding is perhaps evidence of the fact that many Canadian police personnel saw the importance to themselves, the Canadian policing community, and the nation as a whole of providing a safe and secure event. Since mobilizing a large security workforce has numerous challenges, having a significant number of volunteers has tremendous value. Therefore, after having participated in the security workforce, police personnel were asked if they would be willing to volunteer for a future major event. After experiencing the challenges of a long deployment, 67% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they would volunteer to participate in a future major event. While this is a positive finding, it is critically important to gain an understanding of what aspects of the deployment might encourage police personnel to want to volunteer for another event in the future.

Regardless of the nature of the work assignment, the majority (80%) of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their primary work assignment was monotonous. However, 75% of respondents indicated that their work assignment was essential to the overall security of the Games. Both of these factors were associated with whether or not a person found their work assignment to be enjoyable. In terms of finding the work assignment monotonous, generally, individuals who strongly agreed that their job was monotonous were less likely to indicate that their work assignment was enjoyable. It was also evident that those who felt their work assignment was not important were much less likely to enjoy their work than those who felt they played an important role in the overall security of the Games.

Other factors that were related to the enjoyment of the work assignment included feeling that the work environment was safe, feeling that entitled breaks were received, feeling that food and drink were

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\(^9\) (Gamma = 0.515, approx. Sig: 0.000)

\(^10\) (Gamma = 0.558, approx. Sig: 0.000)

\(^11\) (Gamma = 0.558, approx. Sig: 0.000)

\(^12\) (Gamma = 0.275, approx. Sig: 0.000)
accessible on shift\textsuperscript{13}, feeling respected by the public\textsuperscript{14}, and feeling that police from various forces worked well together\textsuperscript{15}. Those who worked indoors were more likely to indicate that their work was enjoyable than those who worked outdoors, although this finding may not be generalizable to major events that take place during other times of the year in other geographic locations.

**Non-work Related Factors Associated with a Long-term Deployment**

It may be impractical to assume that, amidst all of the competing challenges of policing a major event, measures can be taken to increase the level of enjoyment, related to their work assignments, felt by police personnel working as part of the security workforce. However, it may be possible to offset some of the more negative aspects of some work assignments by ensuring that other factors related to the deployment are more positive. Some of the factors that could potentially be controlled are accommodations, opportunities to maintain contact with family and their home detachment, work and shift schedules, and leisure time. Attention to these factors may not improve overall levels of enjoyment for the work assignments; however, they may influence overall satisfaction with the deployment and encourage personnel to want to volunteer again.

A large majority (89\%) of respondents had worked within the security workforce for more than three weeks when they completed the survey. Despite the long deployment, 71\% of respondents indicated that they were satisfied with the length of their deployment. Importantly, being satisfied with the length of the deployment was strongly related to whether or not a person would volunteer for a future major event, as those who were dissatisfied with the time spent away were much less likely to agree that they would volunteer to participate again\textsuperscript{16}.

Respondents’ overall satisfaction with their accommodation was also related to whether or not they would volunteer for a future major event. Those who were satisfied or very satisfied with their accommodations were much more likely to agree that they would volunteer for a future major event than those who were dissatisfied\textsuperscript{17}. Satisfaction with many other factors contributed to the overall satisfaction with the accommodations including the comfort\textsuperscript{18}, privacy\textsuperscript{19}, level of noise\textsuperscript{20}, roommates\textsuperscript{21}, cleanliness\textsuperscript{22}, security of belongings\textsuperscript{23}, and the quality of the food\textsuperscript{24}. Although accommodating such a large workforce can pose major challenges during an event like the Olympic Games, it appears that the quality of accommodations may greatly affect the likelihood of encouraging personnel to volunteer for future events.

Consistently, approximately 70\% of respondents were satisfied with the level of connectivity\textsuperscript{25} afforded to them during their deployment. Overall, they were satisfied with their ability to contact friends and family, and maintain contact with their home detachments. However, the majority of respondents did find the deployment disruptive to their home life responsibilities (71\%), their social lives (60\%), and their ongoing workload (51\%). Fewer respondents (18\%) reported that the deployment would impact

\textsuperscript{13} (Gamma = 0.263, approx. Sig: 0.000)
\textsuperscript{14} (Gamma = 0.249, approx. Sig: 0.000)
\textsuperscript{15} (Gamma = 0.217, approx. Sig: 0.000)
\textsuperscript{16} (Gamma = 0.739, approx. Sig: 0.000)
\textsuperscript{17} (Gamma = 0.454, approx. Sig: 0.000)
\textsuperscript{18} (Gamma = 0.849, approx. Sig: 0.000)
\textsuperscript{19} (Gamma = 0.841, approx. Sig: 0.000)
\textsuperscript{20} (Gamma = 0.626, approx. Sig: 0.000)
\textsuperscript{21} (Gamma = 0.593, approx. Sig: 0.000)
\textsuperscript{22} (Gamma = 0.538, approx. Sig: 0.000)
\textsuperscript{23} (Gamma = 0.537, approx. Sig: 0.000)
\textsuperscript{24} (Gamma = 0.479, approx. Sig: 0.000)
\textsuperscript{25} A business centre was created and made available nearby to those living at the Ballantyne Accommodation vessels, while the business centre in Whistler was not as convenient to the dispersed accommodations.
their relationships with co-workers in their home departments. Although satisfaction with connectivity to home and work had little association with whether or not a respondent would volunteer for a future major event, disruption to one’s home life was related to their willingness to volunteer for future events. Those who found the deployment disruptive to their home, social, and work lives were less likely to agree that they would volunteer to work a major event again. However, 60% of those who found the deployment disruptive still indicated that they would volunteer for a future major event. This finding demonstrates that even though a major event deployment can be disruptive to the majority of the workforce, there may be benefits to the deployment that can compensate for that disruption.

Since the shift schedule was different from a normal policing work schedule, the security workforce had to adapt to some unfamiliar scheduling expectations. Despite these differences, the majority of respondents were satisfied with their shift schedules and the availability of leisure time (62% and 64% respectively). Importantly, satisfaction with the shift schedule was related to whether or not a respondent would volunteer for a future major event. This relationship was stronger than that between satisfaction with leisure time and whether or not a respondent would volunteer for future major events. If alternative shift schedules are employed during a major event, ensuring that the workforce is able to adapt to those schedules will likely result in greater satisfaction overall.

In summary, although there were several factors that contributed to whether or not police personnel were satisfied with their deployment and would volunteer for a future major event deployment, it was evident that there is a certain appeal to participating in a major event that exists despite any negatives with respect to work assignments and disruption to home life. There are many benefits of participating in the security workforce for a major event including having the opportunity to travel, being present during an historic event, working alongside other police from around the country, and gaining valuable career experience. These benefits were reflected in the survey responses, as the top three most enjoyable aspects of the deployment were working with other police agencies (37%), just being at the Olympics (24%), and meeting new people (19%).

The results of the survey clearly indicate that those who joined the security workforce believing that there would be benefits generally had those expectations fulfilled. There was a strong relationship between a respondent’s level of agreement that they had volunteered to participate and their level of agreement that they would volunteer to participate in a future major event. The 988 respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that they volunteered to participate, 758 (77%) agreed or strongly agreed that they would volunteer for a future major event. This relationship remains strong even for those respondents who indicated that the deployment was disruptive to their home life responsibilities. This finding further emphasizes the importance of volunteering to the overall success of a major event deployment. For future major events, emphasis should be placed on ensuring the workforce consists of as many genuine volunteers as possible. This strategy would alleviate some of the challenges involved in mobilization and help to ensure overall satisfaction with the deployment. Finally, this emphasis on volunteerism will build a contingent of police personnel across the country with major event experience that have a willingness to participate in future major events.

Although the Olympic Games are unique in terms of a major event security operation, many of the lessons learned from the experience of policing the Games can be applied to future major events. Of course, the majority of major events do not and will not require the

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26 (Gamma = 0.426, approx. Sig: 0.000)
27 (Gamma = 0.570, approx. Sig: 0.000)
28 (Gamma = 0.259, approx. Sig: 0.000)
29 (Gamma = 0.627, approx. Sig: 0.000)
30 (Gamma = 0.605, approx. Sig: 0.000)
size of workforce or the time commitment needed for the Olympics. However, it is likely that issues such as the length of time away from home, the types of work assignments, and the quality of accommodations will still affect participating personnel.

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**Lessons Learned**

Promote volunteerism with respect to involvement in major events.

Ensure that there is support for a 24/7 professional standards response.

Develop mechanisms to provide staff with an accurate picture of the nature of the deployment.

Obtain representative post-event feedback from deployed staff.
Media Analysis

Security related media coverage of the 2010 Olympics tended, for the most part, to fall into one of four categories. First, was the commentary regarding the extent and expense of security associated with the potential infringement on citizens’ mobility and free speech. Second, was the concern with anti-Olympics protesters. Third, was the focus on incidents that emerged as a direct consequence of hosting the Games. Fourth, and lastly, was the post-Olympic assessment of police presence and security measures.

“The ISU PA team set a new standard in communications support to Major Events that has been praised by our many private and public sector partners.”

Sheila Bird, RCMP Director of Public Affairs

Security Costs

From the moment Vancouver was awarded the 2010 Games there was considerable dialogue regarding the overall costs. This discourse was characterized by discussions about the potential costs for securing the Games, with a focus on issues of transparency.

The extent of media commentary dropped considerably the following year with only a handful of stories. One of the few; a November 24, 2008 story in the National Post titled, “2010 Winter Games security costs soaring” was quite blunt in noting, “The cost of providing security for the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver will be almost three times the initial estimate, in part due to planning mistakes by the Games organizing committee…” While commentators

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31 On May 8, 2007, CTV News reported, “However, some critics say the plan doesn’t include the committee isn’t directly responsible for, like the $175 million to be spent on security that VANOC has budgeted.”

32 This budget statement included military spending which was important but contributed to public and media confusion over the actual costs of security for the games.

33 A popular online entertainment guide ran a much circulated column on February 2, 2010 called, “Security Budget Bursting at Vancouver 2010 Olympics.” The piece included the observation that, “Everyone’s favourite federal Public Safety Minister, Stockwell Day, claims that the original projected security budget of $175 million has grown to Chris Pronger sized proportions and is hovering around the $1 billion mark.” Two days before the Games commenced, the CBC featured a piece, “2010 Olympic security costs still unclear” in which it was written, “Colin Hansen concedes the total bill will be higher than the original estimate of $175 million, but he could not say if it will hit the $1-billion mark that former Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day estimated it might cost last October.”
the overall price tag of hosting the Games and those that dealt with security, not by name, but merely as part of the overall expense. Consequently, it is difficult to determine if some of the financial commentary was speaking specifically to security costs or the larger picture. In any event, security costs was far and away the most common subject matter for media focusing on security issues leading up to the 2010 Winter Games. Commentary was fuelled by the cost itself, but more so by the frequently adjusted numbers that tended to legitimize the story line that spokespersons had been less than forthcoming regarding these costs.

It should be noted that the issue of security costs, clearly of concern to many in British Columbia and the rest of Canada, was also deemed newsworthy in the U.S. NBC, New York Times and the influential Huffington Post all carried stories and commentary, as did other American news organizations, regarding the security costs34.

Media coverage regarding the cost of providing security for the Games can be grouped into two columns; coverage focusing on the expense itself, and commentary on the adjusted tally. The changing estimate to provide security most definitely kept the story current and warranted extended coverage. It should be noted that the finance piece was the dominant story in the pre-Olympic period in media irrespective of the outlet being examined and its historic stance on the Games. In this regard, it would appear the extensive coverage of the financial costs to provide security was very much in the public interest; one of the factors that justify a story’s extended lifespan.

Another pre-Games aspect of security was related to the significant police presence and its potential impact on civil liberties; in particular, the right to free expression, including being able to protest during the 2010 Olympics.

**Civil Liberty Concerns**

In the months and years leading up to the 2010 Games, there was a clear focus on the enormity of the security and concerns regarding protesters. The issue of public protest split into the sub topics of protesters marring the games and the concern that the civil liberty to engage in protest would be compromised by an unprecedented display of police. In particular, there was considerable commentary regarding the status of those seeking to protest the Games or exercise dissent35.

The extent of security was most certainly a story with legs leading up to the Games. The Vancouver Sun ran the story, “There’s a cop on every corner” on February 7, 2010 that included this commentary:

> You are not imagining things if it seems like there’s a police officer on every corner, soldiers constantly patrolling the waters and security guards posted at every Olympic venue. All 15,300 personnel hired to protect Vancouver and Whistler as part of the Winter Games’ $900-million security budget have now arrived from police departments and military bases across Canada.

The **CBC** ran a story on its website on February 2, 2010 that, much like numerous other pieces of coverage, maintained that protesters, rather than terrorists, pose the biggest Olympic security concern. Perhaps surprisingly, there was very little media speculation about the potential for terrorist activity during the Games. Whenever the issue was raised, it was usually done so in a reassuring manner such as the February 3, 2010 Reuters story titled, “Security head says no threats to Vancouver.” Most all major media ran similar headlines following a briefing on security

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34 As an example of just how pervasive this subject matter was, a Google search on February 24, 2010 of “2010 Olympic Costs” yielded almost 10 million hits.

35 Yahoo Sports, on February 11, 2010, ran an item that seemed to summarize the bulk of the media coverage leading up to the Games. It read: The most common criticism is escalating costs — a 2006 government audit put the Olympic bill at $2.5 billion while critics argue it’s closer to $6 billion — set against cuts to education, health care and social services. There are also protests against displacement of an estimated 1,200 residents from the Downtown Eastside, a poor, drug-infested neighbourhood that sits just a few blocks away from — and in stark contrast to — the festival atmosphere of the Olympics. Others are railing against the disappearance of civil liberties amid the presence of a 15,000-member security force, barricaded roads, and surveillance cameras. Tensions rose when the Olympic security force sought out anti-Olympic protesters at their homes, work and in the streets leading up the Games. They rose again as protesters were turned away trying to enter Canada this week — despite ORN advice to try to look like a tourist: “If you can, buy a hockey jersey.”
plans to reporters by the Assistant Commissioner in charge of the Olympics.

One point of confusion captured in the pre-Olympics coverage was the issue of “protest zones” in part due to conflicting reports of protests being designated to specific locations. This confusion is captured in the juxtaposition of an article entitled “Memo to Olympic protesters: Canada is a free speech zone — Police assure protesters they can, in fact, gather in any public space downtown, despite the city’s ‘safe assembly zones’” and a column titled, “Olympic protest zones do not exist, VPD says.”

Leading up to the 2010 Olympics, there were some well-publicized incidents that fuelled claims of overzealous security measures. Possibly the most significant such story was published the day before the Opening Ceremonies when The New York Times ran an article entitled, “Concerns as Canada Balances Protests and Civil Liberties.” It began:

Christopher A. Shaw, a middle-class, middle-aged professor of ophthalmology at the University of British Columbia, seems an unlikely target of police interest. But Shaw is also the author of “Five Ring Circus: Myths and Realities of the Olympic Games,” a book highly critical of the Olympics and his hometown’s decision to host them. Over the past year, Shaw has been approached by plainclothes officers from the Integrated Security Unit, an Olympics operation led by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who want to discuss his book and his views about the Olympics. Friends of Shaw’s in Vancouver and as far away as Toronto have received similar approaches, as has his ex-wife.

But Shaw is not alone. Several other people who oppose the city’s decision to host the Games and who plan to participate in demonstrations say they have also been approached by plainclothes police officers, as have their friends and relatives. Others have come home to find business cards from police officers slipped under the doors. Last week, Martin Macias of Chicago, another critic of the Olympics, said he was detained and interrogated by border agents at Vancouver International Airport and not allowed to enter British Columbia.

Amidst these controversial subject matters were a number of stories oriented toward educating the public about the security infrastructure of the 2010 Games. On January 22, 2010, Global BC entitled one such feature, “A look inside ‘top secret’ Vancouver Olympic security command centre.” The issue of balancing security with civil liberties and protest was far and away the most contentious and controversial issue covered by the media prior to the games. Part of what made it such a divisive and charged subject matter is that it was very much a matter of speculation. It could be argued that this entire issue, during the pre Games period, was a “what if” item that lent itself to considerable speculation. In essence, security and Games organizers were frequently challenged to respond to concerns; not based on something that happened, but in regard to what might occur once the Games were underway. One narrative that played itself out over and over again in the coverage was the potential for a significant security presence to compromise civil liberties and lawful protest. As such, incidents, such as an author being detained and questioned upon arriving in Canada could potentially be interpreted as validation of previously raised concerns.

Incident Driven Coverage

Media coverage and commentary related to policing and security during the 2010 Olympics was very much reactive journalism with a handful of incidents...
prompting most all the coverage in this area. On the second day of the Games an anti-Olympic protest in downtown Vancouver turned violent and local, national and international media were on the story. A Wall Street Journal story began:

*Anti-Olympic protests turned violent here Saturday, as demonstrators smashed windows, overturned newspaper boxes and spray-painted buildings and cars downtown. Vancouver police said that about 100 masked protesters marched through the city Sunday morning, kicking cars, ripping down signs and vandalizing buildings. The masked protesters, who the police say were intermingled with a few hundred other "legitimate" demonstrators, smashed...*

This story took on a particular life of its own with follow-up coverage focusing on several sidebars including the diversity of motivations and issues of the various protest groups. A February 27, 2010 Vancouver Sun article titled, “Black bloc taints anti-Olympic movement — Destructive tactics fail to attract public sympathy for the cause and alienate moderate activists” was quite typical of media response to the incident.

One of the prominent passages in the lengthy article was quite telling, “Chris Shaw, the Vancouver General Hospital medical researcher who has become one of the city’s most prominent anti-Olympic activists, said during the debate last week that the black-bloc tactics had sabotaged the protest movement.” This theme of protester fragmentation was evident throughout much of the follow-up coverage.

With the exception of a couple relatively minor protest related incidents, the issue virtually disappeared from the newspapers for the remainder of the Games. Two other unrelated incidents attracted the most media coverage during the Games. The first was reported on a global basis and was far and away the one security incident that will be remembered. CTV’s February 17, 2010 story was typical of that which was reported internationally, “Man infatuated with U.S. VP breaches security.” The story of a “mentally ill man with a homemade security pass was able to get within metres of U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden during a security breach at the Opening Ceremony of the 2010 Winter Olympic Games” dominated the news. The story itself did not result in much spin off or secondary analysis other than narratives such as CTV’s “Officials scramble to explain security breach.” This follow-up story, similarly widely disseminated, repeated assurances such as the one given by Adam Gray, vice-president of security integration at VANOC, that the system worked effectively and was “confident that the venue security system ensures a safe and secure environment for all” and that “changes were made to ensure that another breach of security does not happen.”

**Post-Games Media Coverage**

Three security related items received a modest amount of media attention once the Games had concluded. The first revisited the price tag issue and was a reference to B.C. and Ottawa agreeing to split the costs. The story appeared in most all major media and did not generate a significant number of follow-up commentaries.

Another mildly repeated item was a series of mixed messages regarding the crime rate during the Games. On February 28, 2010 The Province newspaper reported that, “Crime rate did not fall during Games.” Specifically, the story noted, “Violent crime in Vancouver has climbed 17 per cent since the start of the Olympics -- mainly due to assaults on police during the protests downtown.” Conversely, a March 17, 2010 story in the Vancouver Sun claimed, “Crime numbers drop in Vancouver during the Olympics.” The story led off with the statement, “New statistics from the Vancouver Police Department show that during the 17 days of the 2010 Winter Olympics the total number of all crimes fell by about one-and-a-half per cent, even though violent crimes rose.”

There was also some follow-up coverage of the B.C. Civil Liberties Association, as in this Vancouver Courier story, “Civil liberties group lauds police conduct during the Games,” repeating their relief that “the worst excesses we were worried about have not come to pass.”
In summary, in anticipation of the 2010 Olympics, Canadian media tended to focus on two subject matters; the competitions and security. The security coverage was divided into addressing the costs of providing security and the threats to security, namely protesters and terrorism. The security price tag was a dynamic, reoccurring theme for journalists because officials repeatedly revised the numbers. Had the original estimate been maintained it’s unlikely the issue would have been so newsworthy for so long with so many revisited and revised narratives. Almost all the less than favourable coverage regarding security can be attributed to the changed price tag.

The subject of a terrorist threat during the Games received less attention than one might have expected. Mere speculation is not considered journalism at its best so there may have been a reluctance to hypothetically convey potential incidents that might be considered little more than sensational fear mongering. Media, however, was much more willing to speculate about protesters; protesters behaving badly and protesters being silenced by a “security blanket.” The first major incident involving protesters turned violent and both the media and public opinion appeared to be on side with law enforcement and critical of the protesters. Thereafter, the issue of protest was given minimal attention. Coverage during the Games was responsive and incident driven. This was very much a case of matter-of-fact coverage with a minimum of editorializing and was, for the most part, favourable or neutral toward those responsible for securing the Games. Overall, the actual Olympic competitions pushed security related issues (other than the one involving the U.S. Vice-President) off the radar. Post-Olympic coverage of security themes was minimal.

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**Lessons Learned**

Recognize that financial costs of major events are the primary focus of the media and the public until some other event-related issue shifts the focus.

Emphasize the importance of having a strong community relations piece in lessening the likelihood of negative coverage due to protest, business displacement, and community concerns.
IMPACT ON CRIME

In the time leading up to the 2010 Winter Games, there were two competing notions with regard to how hosting the games would impact crime rates across the province. Some believed that the increase in ambient population within and around the host city would increase the likelihood that criminals would come in contact with potential victims and, amidst the celebrations of the Games, crime would increase within those areas directly affected. Others felt that, with the increase in police presence and the overall distraction of the Games, crime would diminish in and around the host city during the weeks of festivities. The former position was perhaps the popular notion among casual observers who would assume that larger crowds naturally translate into more crime. The latter was the view commonly held by those within the policing community who were aware that, in general, past Olympic hosts had not witnessed increases in crime.

“The 2010 Olympic Winter Games were a success by any measure, including the absence of any increase in crime. In fact, serious criminal activity within the Urban Domain appears to have dropped in the lead up to, and during the Games.”

Dr. Peter German, Assistant Commissioner, District Commander, Lower Mainland District RPS, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

This section provides an analysis of the crimes that came to the attention of police in three areas: those jurisdictions that fell within the Olympic Area (Vancouver, Whistler, Squamish, Richmond, and West Vancouver); those jurisdictions within the Lower Mainland, an area surrounding the city of Vancouver and including the Fraser Valley; and the remaining jurisdictions within the province of British Columbia. To determine the impact of the Olympics on crime, this section provides the crime rates within each of these three areas during the first three months of each of the past five years. Given that the Olympics took place during the month of February, the comparison will focus specifically on whether or not the changes within the first three months of 2010 differ substantially from trends from the previous four years. The comparison focuses specifically on Canadian Criminal Code offences, and does not include trends with regard to traffic, parking, or other violations that do not constitute a crime.

Factors Related to the Olympics that May Influence Crime

A number of factors must be considered to understand the impact that the 2010 Olympic Winter Games had on crime. The areas in and around the Olympic venues, which experienced the increased crowds, were secured by an added police force from the Integrated Security Unit. Such a visible police presence has the potential to deter crime within those crowded areas. Also, with an increase in visitors, many of whom came from outside of Canada, there was a likelihood that some victimization went unreported due to unfamiliarity with the criminal justice system or feeling that the system could not help a visitor who would only be around for a short period of time. There is also the potential that, with an increased police presence in host areas, crime was displaced to the surrounding communities, as active criminals move away from the crowds to areas perceived to be receiving less police attention. Finally, as the security workforce consisted of police officers working in detachments across Canada, those detachments would be left with a fewer officers. While the officers were not taken away from general patrol duties, there was a possibility that crime may have been affected indirectly in other communities as a result of fewer police resources in support functions.
Of course, the Olympic Games attract a great deal of political and media attention. This added attention brings with it a potential for specific incidents and crime that would not normally occur within the host city. While security incidents may or may not constitute criminal behaviour, they do represent a potential threat to those living in the area. During the 2010 Olympic Games, there were only a few security incidents, most notably including an anti-Olympic riot and the presence of an intruder at the opening ceremonies.

**Crime During the Olympic Month**

Looking more closely at the month of February for each year, Figure 3 shows changes in the average daily number of criminal code offences in the three areas. Since the Olympic Area represents only five cities, this bar chart does not offer a strong comparison between the three areas, but rather, it provides an illustration of the monthly trends year after year for each area. By examining the month of February specifically, it is apparent that February 2010, the month of the Olympic Games, exhibited nothing out of the ordinary in terms of crime rates across the three areas. In fact, in all three areas, the crime rates in February 2010 were nearly identical with those from 2009, this occurring after a general decline in crime across the province over the previous five years.

*Figure 3: Comparing Crime Rates in the Olympic Area, the Surrounding Areas, and the Rest of British Columbia: Average Daily Criminal Code Offences by Month for Five Years*
Based on the data presented in Figure 3, there is no evidence to suggest that crime increased in and around Olympic venues due to the Olympic festivities. In fact, the average number of daily offences in the Olympic Area in February, 2010 exhibited a 4% drop from those recorded in 2009. The chart also shows little evidence that crime was displaced to surrounding communities. In fact, for those communities in the rest of the Lower Mainland, February, 2010 had an identical average number of daily offences to February, 2009. It also appears that there was little effect on the remaining communities in the province as a result of the temporary reallocation of policing resources to the Olympic Area. While there was a slight increase in crime for the rest of British Columbia during the Olympic month, the average number of daily offences was less than 2% greater than the previous February.

Of course, given that crime rates have been on a general decline in British Columbia over the past five years, it is also necessary to examine the month of the Olympic Games within the context of the first quarter of 2010 and compare it to other first quarter trends. Comparing the crime trends for the first three months of 2009 and 2010, it is apparent that the crime rates in 2010 do not deviate substantially from the monthly trends from the previous year for any of the three areas despite the hosting of the 2010 Winter Olympic Games. In both years, the Olympic Area experienced an increase in the average number of offences per day from January to February, followed by a decrease in March. While the increase in February 2010 (7%) was slightly greater than that from 2009 (5%), and the following decrease in March 2010 was less prominent (6% decrease in 2010 and 9% decrease in 2009), the general trend was very similar. The trends in the rest of the Lower Mainland and the rest of British Columbia for 2010 also showed little change from the previous year. Perhaps the only noticeable differences between 2009 and 2010 were the rates in March. In the areas not part of the Olympic Area, the increases in crimes from February to March were slightly greater in 2010 than in 2009. These minor differences cannot necessarily be attributed to the hosting of the Olympic Games, but are more likely simply slight variations that should be expected of a fairly stable trend in crime rates. Given that the crime rates in February, and the monthly first quarter trends for 2010 differ only slightly from those recorded in 2009 for all three areas, there is little evidence to suggest that crime rates were impacted by the hosting of the Olympic Games.

In summary, it appears that hosting the 2010 Olympic Winter Games had little effect on the amount of crime in and around the host cities or across the province. In the Olympic Area itself, crime continued its downward trend of the previous five years. This analysis suggests that despite increased crowds in and around the host city, crime rates were largely unaffected. Given that the Olympic Games tend to attract crowds composed of groups of people who are not generally associated with crime (international visitors, athletes, sporting fans, affluent spectators, etc.), this finding was largely to be expected. Furthermore, the findings appear to dispel notions that crime in the surrounding areas would increase due to displacement or that the reallocation of police resources from the rest of the province would result in changes to crime rates outside of the Lower Mainland. In general, across the province the trends from 2010 were so similar to those from 2009 that the effect of hosting the Olympics on crime rates appears to be negligible.

Although the overall number of crimes that occurred during the first quarter of 2010 did not show any substantial changes from 2009, especially in the month of February, this does not necessarily mean that hosting the Olympics does not have any effect on crime. It is possible that although hosting the Olympics did not impact crime rates, the festivities may have influenced specific types of criminal

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38 There was an average of 188 offences per day in the Olympic Area in February, 2010, compared to 196 daily offences in the same area in February, 2009.

39 In the rest of BC, there was an average of 439 offences per day in February, 2010, and an average of 432 offences per day in the previous February.

40 In the Lower Mainland, there was a 5% increase in the average number of daily offences between February and March, 2010 compared to a 1% increase in the previous year. In the rest of BC there was a 6% increase in the average number of daily offences between February and March, 2010 compared to a 2% increase in the previous year.
behavior. While it is conceivable that the Olympic celebrations could lead to some additional incidents of violence or that an added police presence in and around the Olympic venues could deter some property crime, it is beyond the scope of this report to provide any solid conclusions as to whether or not this was indeed the case. Also, it must be recognized that although it does not appear that the Olympics had much of an impact on crime overall, this should not diminish the fact that crimes did occur and people were victimized during that time period, and there is always a need to work toward reducing crime in all situations.

Lessons Learned

Crime in and around a host city is not likely to be affected by a major event. Nor is crime likely to be displaced to surrounding communities.
The purpose of this report was to evaluate the planning and execution of security for the Vancouver Olympic Winter Games as those functions were related to the Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit. There can never be clear and simple evaluative “answers” in assessing the operations associated with an event of the nature and magnitude of the Games. However, the methodology employed in this project has provided a comprehensive examination of the operations associated with the Integrated Security Unit in the planning and execution of security for the Games. This report has detailed 38 issues that have been framed as lessons learned to support the planning and execution of major events security in the future.

“Security investment always leaves a good legacy of security for the country…The security arrangements are not there only for the 17 days of competition…Whenever the Games are finished, everything that has been built, the expertise that has been acquired, the hardware that has been put in place, is serving the country and the regions for decades to follow.”

Jacques Rogge, President, International Olympic Committee

Organizational Structure

A responsibility assignment matrix must be in place at the outset.

Leaders at the top of the responsibility matrix will benefit from having trusted relationships with one another.

A 2 I/C must be appointed at the outset and given the authority to oversee daily work.

The principles of the V2010 ISU Olympic C2 Model are transferable and scalable to any major event.

Finance

A financial responsibility matrix must be in place at the outset of the project.

A dedicated Director of Finance must be in place at the outset of the project.

Once approved by all concerned an effective and efficient internal and external financial communication strategy must be in place at the outset of the project.

Assume that many suppliers of goods and services will be inclined to charge the event more than they normally would to their clients generally.

Staffing

Job descriptions with associated responsibilities and skill sets should be in place at the outset of the project.

Emphasize getting the right people in the right roles.

Expect and plan for non-stop change regarding mobilization.

Community Relations

Integrate the CRG within the C2 model.

Emphasize the significance of the philosophical and operational distinction between Community Relations and Public Affairs.

Operationally acknowledge the importance of local knowledge and the legacy of relations.

Develop mechanisms to share timely, accurate and meaningful information with key stakeholders.
Intelligence

Start with a well developed, articulated threat matrix with scalable and built in operational options.

Clear communication of threat levels to planners is essential.

As much as possible, leverage existing intelligence and associated infrastructure/processes.

Resist the temptation to inflate threat risks.

Planning for Operational Support Functions

It is important to start as early as possible to plan operational support functions and commence procurement activities.

The nature and extent of the tasks to be accomplished must be clear and well articulated.

Planners must be aware of standardized policies and procedures.

Informatics

Informatics requests must have proper associated operational needs.

Utilize a stand-alone network.

Ensure that a procurements option is included in all requirements analyses.

Ensure informatics plans conform to user requirements (resist the reverse).

A detailed informatics plan with a comprehensive options analysis is critical.

Exercises

Exercises should be considered one of the most important components in planning and preparing for a major event.

While exercising the catastrophic is necessary, exercising the routine is equally necessary.

Planning deadlines associated with exercises must be enforced.

Develop a support mechanism to encourage partners to produce plans.

Impact of Major Event Deployment on Police Personnel

Promote volunteerism with respect to involvement in major events.

Ensure that there is support for a 24/7 professional standards response.

Develop mechanisms to provide staff with an accurate picture of the nature of the deployment.

Obtain representative post-event feedback from deployed staff.

Media Analysis

Recognize that financial costs of major events are the primary focus of the media and the public until some other event-related issue shifts the focus.

Emphasize the importance of having a strong community relations piece in lessening the likelihood of negative coverage due to protest, business displacement, and community concerns.

Impact on Crime

Crime in and around a host city is not likely to be affected by a major event. Nor is crime likely to be displaced to surrounding communities.

It is clear from this list of lessons learned and best practices that the most critical elements of major event planning revolve around organizational structure, financial accountability, threat assessment, communication, and human resources.
Central Finding

We would like to conclude this report with what we perceive to be the most central finding that underpins all 38 of the issues identified and provides a framework for change that would ensure that the legacy of the Games is not lost as individuals and groups try to reinvent the wheel as is too often the case. The overarching recommendation is that the Major Events and Protective Services Unit (ME&PS) be expanded and reconstituted in function to clarify its role in major event planning and to enhance its ability to perform the functions that are so aptly situated within its walls.

Interestingly, it would appear that the actual mandate of the Major Events and Protective Services Unit was not well understood or articulated within the ISU with many working from the assumption that the unit had no authority or oversight role with respect to the security planning and operations associated with the Winter Games. However, the mandate of the ME&PS Unit is very clear:

Major Events’ role involves the development of a sustainable and integrated security framework for all major events and overseeing its implementation. This involvement includes: determining the nature, magnitude and complexity of an event; determining security requirements; developing and managing budgets; determining major procurements and asset management; providing functional guidance to divisions; overseeing the planning process; as well as developing national and international partnerships.41

It is our position that the role and responsibilities of the ME&PS need to be revisited and revised to emphasize a support and resource role to Divisions as they plan for and execute the security for major events being staged in their areas. This unit would be positioned to be more heavily involved in the initiation stages of the planning for any major event and then transition to assume a support and resource function as the Division moves forward operationally.

In addition to this policy shift, there is an increased opportunity to provide a more responsive and effective planning model through the development of a project management orientation within the unit and ideally within Divisions. This project management orientation would emphasize options analysis within a context that situates risk at its foundation with attentiveness to rigorous and timely definitions of project scope, timelines, financial parameters as well as human resource considerations, communication strategies and procurement policies. To operationalize this model, this report recommends the restructuring of ME&PS to include an in-house team with expertise in the following areas: project management, finance, mobilization, logistics, human resources, informatics, exercises, community relations, and intelligence. Under this model, ME&PS would be very much a resource, training, mentorship, and library centre to Divisions across the country responsible for hosting major events to facilitate their readiness as major event hosts.

With NHQ’s role being squarely in a support and resource function though the ME&PS unit and a team of specialized personnel that have the ability to move from a more active role at bid and initiation stages to a more supportive role in planning and execution, the RCMP will be on the cutting edge of security planning for major events. The scalability and flexibility of the C2 model coupled with a more nuanced and congruent role for NHQ through ME&PS supported by strong senior management will ensure that the legacy value of the 2010 Winter Olympic Games will not be lost and will instead be the foundation for the planning and operations for all future major events.

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41 ME & PS Branch Role statement for Major Events
Afterword

It was my pleasure and privilege to work with the police officers of the RCMP-led Vancouver Games Integrated Security Unit during the final two years of planning leading up to the Olympic Games.

The Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games were clearly among the best Olympic Games in the history of this major event. Canadian athletes were very successful, helping to create a great sense of unbridled pride in their fellow citizens.

The security layer, led by the RCMP and comprised of police officers from all across Canada, implemented security plans that were five years in the making. The policemen and women who prepared these plans had a single security mission: “a safe and secure event”.

However; the planning theme — “it’s a sporting event, not a security event” — required them to think and work outside their training and experience. They rallied to this requirement and performed admirably.

The University of the Fraser Valley team was asked to provide an independent examination of specific planning processes and collect a public view of security activities. Their report forms an important legacy that will be an aid to future major event security planners.

Sincerely,

Dix Lawson
V2101 ISU Project Manager

Maintiens le Droit